Univ.of  III.  Library 


51 

c.A 


new  York  national 
Bank  Presidents' 
Conspiracy 

Industry  ana 
Property 


A HISTORY  OF  THE  PANIC 
OF  1893.  ITS  ORGANIZA- 
TION  AND  METHODS  


The  American  Bimetallic  Union 

604  JOURNAL  BUILDING 
Chicago,  111. 


THE 


NEW  YORK  NATIONAL 
BANK  PRESIDENTS’ 
CONSPIRACY 

AGAINST  INDUSTRY  AND  PROPERTY 


A HISTORY  OF  THE  FANIC  OF  1 893;  ITS  ORGANIZA- 
TION AND  METHODS 


By  J.  W.  SCHUCKERS 


Private  Secretary  to  Salmon  P Chase ; President  Lincoln'’ s 
Secretary  of  the  Treasury,  during  the  Civil  War, 


Croat 


PUBLISHED  EY 

THE  AMERICAN  BIMETALLIC  UNION 

134  Monroe  St.,  Chicago,  III. 


Cppyright 

By  J.  W.  Schuckers 
1894 


Newark,  Nov.  20,  1895. 


Hon.  Edward  B.  Light, 

Secretary  American  Bimetallic  Union, 

134  Monroe  Street,  Chicago,  111. 

Dear  Sir: — My  ‘History  of  the  New  York  National 
Bank  Presidents’  Conspiracy  against  Industry  and 
Property,’  is  a straightforward,  unambiguous,  wholly 
unrhetorical  statement  of  the  facts  of  the  most  infa- 
mous assault  ever  made  by  criminal  men  upon  the 
public  and  private  welfare  of  any  people — outside  of 
actual  war. 

My  earnest  desire  has  been — my  earnest  desire  now 
is — that  the  facts  of  that  conspiracy  shall  be  probed  to 
the  bottom,  either  by  a commission  of  Congress  or  by 
the  courts.  It  is  not  worth  while  to  appeal  to  the  New 
York  courts.  I do  not  know  that  it  is  worth  while  to 
appeal  to  Congress.  What  I do  know  is — that  if  ever 
an  investigation  is  had,  it  will  develop  an  infamy  that 
will  appall  the  people,  and,  as  I hope,  will  move  them 
to  execute  justice  upon  the  National  Bank  assassins 
who  in  1893  did  so  much  evil.  I am, 

Very  truly  yours, 

J.  W.  Schuckers. 


5 


THE 


BANKERS’  CONSPIRACY 

i. 

My  design  in  writing  the  following  pages  (originally 
in  letters  to  my  most  excellent  friend,  Mr.  Henry 
CareyBaird  of  Philadelphia)  was  to  arouse  the  American 
people — if  such  a thing  were  possible;  of  which,  how- 
ever, I was  not  sanguine — to  the  absolutely  certain  fact 
that  a stupendous  crime  had  been  committed  against 
them,  a crime  so  wanton  and  infamous  in  its  delibera- 
tion and  methods  that  all  should  join  to  punish  it  if  the 
public  justice  is  worth  preserving. 

The  panic  of  1893  was  a colossal  calamity  that  in- 
volved tens  of  thousands  of  men  and  women  in  com- 
mercial and  industrial  ruin;  that  involved  hundreds 
of  thousands — even  millions  of  men  and  women — in  loss 
and  extreme  mental  and  physical  distress. 

My  aim  is  to  show  that  this  destructive  panic  was  the 
work  of  a deliberately  determined  conspiracy ; that  this 
conspiracy  originated  in  Wall  Street;  that  it  was  organ- 
ized in  Wall  Street;  that  it  was  engineered  from  Wall 

Street — and  that  in  its  front,  as  the  active  agents  in  car- 

7 


8 


THE  BANKERS’  CONSPIRACY 


rying  it  into  execution,  stood  a score  of  lawless  New  York 
National  Bank  presidents,  backed  and  supported  by  the 
entire  Associated  Banks  of  that  city.  I propose  to  present 
the  facts  and  the  proofs,  and  to  these  facts  and  proofs 
I ask  the  attention  of  the  people.  I will  present  them 
as  briefly  as  possible. 

II. 

The  presidential  campaign  of  1892  was  waged  practi- 
cally, upon  a single  issue — the  tariff. 

The  silver  question  was  discussed  incidentally  only. 
“The  fading  out  of  the  silver  issue,”  said  the  New  York 
Evening  Post , on  the  15th  of  October,  1892,  “is  one  of  the 
unmistakable  signs  of  the  times.  Hardly  anybody  talks 
about  it  now,  except  those  engaged  in  the  production  of 
the  metal.”  But  this  was  not  a true  statement.  The 
fading  out  of  the  silver  issue,  if  it  had  any  meaning  at 
all,  meant  simply  that  the  party  leaders  on  both  sides 
had  agreed  upon  a program,  the  outcome  of  which  has 
been  the  repeal  of  the  silver  law  of  1890,  and  the  Senate 
tariff  act — an  act  that  was  satisfactory  to  no  party  and 
to  no  section. 

III. 

The  presidential  preference  of  the  New  York  bankers 
and  brokers  in  1892  was  for  Grover  Cleveland.  They  gave 
a practically  unanimous  support  to  his  candidacy — 
many  of  them  abandoning  their  former  party  associ- 
ations in  order  to  do  so.  Conspicuous  instances  of  this 
abandonment  were  George  G.  Williams,  president  of  the 


THE  BANKERS’  CONSPIRACY  9 

Chemical  National  Bank,  and  George  S.  Coe,  president 
of  the  American  Exchange  National;  both  old  men,  and 
life-long  Republicans.  These  men  did  not  become  Dem- 
ocrats. They  made  no  pretense  of  being  Democrats, 
or  that  they  had  any  sympathy  whatever  with  the 
objects  the  Democratic  party  was  seeking  to  accomplish. 
They  were  Cleveland  Republicans;  a political  scab 
peculiar  to  Wall  Street  and  like  precincts.  They  were 
Cleveland  Republicans  because  they  expected  to  control 
Grover  Cleveland  to  their  own  uses,  as  they  subse- 
quently did, when  they  involved  him  and  his  administra- 
tion in  their  piratical  scheme  for  panic  and  destruction 
of  property. 

The  alliance  of  Grover  Cleveland  with  these  malignant 
and  criminal  bankers  was  an  unmitigated  national  ca- 
lamity, from  the  disastrous  effects  of  which  no  Ameri- 
can of  this  generation  will  live  to  see  a final  recovery. 

IV. 

Immediately  that  the  result  of  the  presidential  elec- 
tion was  made  known,  the  Associated  National  Banks 
and  bankers  of  New  York  set  up  a terrific  scream  for 
the  immediate  unconditional  repeal  of  the  Sherman  sil- 
ver law — the  repeal  of  that  law  being  the  first  step  in 
their  scheme  for  a reconstruction  of  the  monetary  sys- 
tem— a reconstruction  intended  to  still  further  increase 
the  power  and  control  of  the  National  Banks  over  the 
industry,  the  commerce  and  the  property  of  the  country. 

This  scream  was  everywhere  taken  up  by  the  Bank 
journals  and  the  Bank  politicians,  and  grew  steadily  in 


10 


THE  BANKERS’  CONSPIRACY 


fierceness  and  volume  until,  by  the  time  of  the  meeting 
of  the  second  session  of  the  Fifty-second  Congress,  De- 
cember 6,  1892,  the  noise  and  clamor  made  by  the  aggre- 
gated National  Bank  confederates,  their  mercenaries 
and  panderers — Administrative,  Congressional  and 
otherwise — filled  the  land  to  the  practical  exclusion  of 
every  other  subject  of  political  importance. 

y. 

Congress  had  scarcely  met  when  theWall  Street  mem- 
bers began  operations.  Bills  for  the  repeal  of  the  silver 
law  were  promptly  introduced  into  both  House  and  Sen- 
ate. The  friends  of  these  bills  were  intolerant  for  in- 
stant action.  They  tried  to  shut  off  debate  by  forcing 
a rule  for  closure.  But  it  was  soon  discovered  that  there 
was  a large  body  of  men  not  under  the  domination 
of  the  Wall  Street  ring  who  were  determined  upon  a 
vigorous  resistance. 

One  of  the  most  active  of  this  Wall  Street  ring  was 
John  Sherman.  As  a matter  of  fact  this  man  Sherman 
had  promised,  in  writing,  that  if  ten  Democratic  senators 
could  be  pledged  to  follow  him,  he  would  procure  the 
repeal  of  the  act  before  the  end  of  the  session. 

VI. 

There  is  every  reason  to  believe  that  it  was  in  some  con- 
nection with  this  written  promise  of  John  Sherman’s 
that  Grover  Cleveland  sent  two  agents  to  Washington — 
Messrs.  Henry  Villard  and  uDon”  M.  Dickinson— to 
threaten  the  use  of  the  Federal  patronage  against  those 


THE  BANKERS5  CONSPIRACY 


11 


Democratic  members  of  Congress  who  preferred  their 
principles,  and  the  interests  of  their  constituents,  to 
the  demands  of  the  Wall  Street  combine. 

VII. 

Grover  Cleveland  was  thrown  into  a state  of  great 
astonishment  and  high  displeasure  when  it  came  to  his 
knowledge  that  a distinct  majority  of  the  Democrats  in 
Congress  were  opposed  to  the  repeal.  Mr.  Cleveland  de- 
sired that  currencyureform”should  take  precedence  over 
all  other  kinds  of  reform — of  which  he  professed  to  have 
a large  variety  in  stock — -and  had  resolved,  immediately 
after  his  reelection  in  1892,  to  make  the  unconditional 
repeal  of  the  silver  law,  and  fidelity  to  his  policy  of  re- 
peal, the  test  of  fidelity  to  himself  and  to  his  coming  ad- 
ministration ; and,  in  pursuance  of  this  resolve,  that  those 
Democratic  members  of  Congress  who  did  not  conform  to 
his  wishes  must  stand  aside — must  take  back  seats;  must 
expect  no  favors  from  him  of  any  kind.  His  newspaper 
organs  in  New  York  City— the  Herald  and  the  Times , 
which  were  also  organs  of  the  banks — very  evidently  by 
inspiration, in  elaborate  editorial  articles  printed  in  both 
journals  on  the  same  day, declared  that  those  Democratic 
congressmen  who  opposed  the  repeal  must  go  into  retire- 
ment. 

VIII. 

Mr.  Cleveland’s  first  agent  to  the  recalcitrant  con- 
gressmen of  his  own  party  was  a well-known  New  York 
financier,  Mr.  Henry  Villard.  Mr.  Villard  appeared  in 
Washington  on  the  12th  of  January,  1893;  and  being 


12 


THE  BANKERS5  CONSPIRACY 


a man  of  business,  as  be  himself  said,  lost  no  time  after 
his  arrival,  but  got  immediately  into  communication 
with  leading  Democrats,  who  were  instructed  by  him 
as  to  Mr.  Grover  Cleveland’s  wishes  and  purposes  about 
the  silver  law.  He  succeeded  in  getting  the  names  of 
twelve  Democratic  senators,  whD  authorized  him  to  say 
that  they  would  vote  for  the  repeal — presumably  under 
Sherman’s  lead.  Mr.  Villard  made  a list  of  these  pliant 
senators,  which  he  personally  handed  to  Sherman.  This 
list  was  afterward  reinforced  by  the  addition  of  three 
more  names. 

Mr.  Henry  Villard’s  efforts  on  this  occasion  were  not 
confined  to  conferences  with  Sherman  and  the  Democrat- 
ic senators, who  were  to  be  persuaded  or  dragooned  into 
voting  for  the  repeal.  He  had  interviews  with  “leading 
Republican  senators”— from  which  it  is  to  be  inferred 
that  in  all  matters  relating  to  the  demands  of  Wall 
Street,  Grover  Cleveland  and  the  leading  Republican 
senators,  particularly  Sherman,  were  communicating 
through  Mr.  Villard,  and  were  acting  in  union.  Mr. 
Villard  was  in  Washington  five  days,  and  was  very 
active  and  industrious;  even  going  so  far  as  to  confer 
with  Speaker  Crisp  and  others — members  of  the  House 
Committee  on  Rules — with  a view  to  a change  in  the  pro- 
cedure of  the  House  intended  to  restrict  debate  on  the 
repeal  bill.  But  Congress  did  not  act. 

After  waiting  a fortnight  Cleveland  dispatched  a sec- 
ond agent,  Mr.  Don  Manuel  Dickinson,  of  Michigan. 
Dickinson  appears  to  have  been  clothed  with  more  ex- 


THE  BANKERS’  CONSPIRACY 


18 


tensive  powers  than  Henry  Villard  had  been,  and  his 
advent  at  the  Capitol  was  announced  with  correspond- 
ingly greater  impressiveness.  “Don  Manuel  Dickinson 
came  to  the  city  last  night,  ” said  a Washington  dispatch 
to  the  New  York  Herald , under  date  of  February  1, 
1898,  “and  has  spent  the  day  in  consultation  with  the 
Democratic  leaders.  The  repeal  of  the  silver  law  never 
before  received  such  an  agitation.  . . The  word  has 

gone  out  among  Democrats  that  this  act  must  be  re- 
pealed at  this  session.  . . Mr.  Cleveland  has  it  in  his 
power  to  make  matters  very  uncomfortable  for  certain 
silver  Democrats.  The  question  of  the  patronage  will 
be  an  important  one  after  March  4.  . . The  scare 

is  pretty  general.  . . There  is  no  doubt  that  this 

second  expression  of  President-elect  Cleveland  will  bear 
fruit.  He  gave  his  first  intimation  when  Mr.  Henry 
Villard  came  to  the  city  and  consulted  with  Democratic 
members  of  Congress.  The  second  cannot  be  misunder- 
stood.” 

In  the  same  number  of  the  Herald  that  contained  this 
dispatch  there  appeared  an  elaborate  editorial  article, 
evidently  inspired  either  directly  by  Grover  Cleveland  or 
by  one  of  his  responsible  agents.  “As  a party  man,” 
said  the  writer  of  this  article,  “as  an  upholder  of  the 
regular  organization,  as  a vindicator  of  the  machine, 
Mr.  Cleveland  will  stand  on  firm  groundwhen  he  declares 
that  every  aspirant  for  office,  patronage,  favor  or  any 
consideration  will  be  expected  to  line  up  for  the  repeal 
of  the  silver  law.” 


14 


THE  BANKERS’  CONSPIRACY 


Dispatches  and  editorials  of  a like  kind  with  those 
above  quoted  from  the  Herald  appeared  on  the  same  day 
in  the  Times , another  New  York  organ  of  Grover  Cleve- 
land and  the  National  Bank  presidents. 

IX. 

But  Dickinson’s  mission  was  as  unsuccessful  as  that  of 
Villard,  and  the  patronage  scheme  turned  out  an  utter 
failure.  No  doubt  there  were  Democrats  base  enough  to 
be  influenced  by  it,  but  the  great  body  of  the  party — in 
the  Fifty-second  Congress  at  least — stood  firmly  to  their 
principles.  The  end  of  the  agitation  for  the  session  was 
reached  when  both  Houses,  by  decisive  votes — the  Sen- 
ate on  February  6 and  the  House  on  February  9— re- 
fused to  consider  bills  for  repeal. 

X. 

The  failure  of  the  missions  of  Henry  Villard  and  D. 
M.  Dickinson,  and  the  consequent  discovery  by  Grover 
Cleveland  and  the  New  York  National  Bank  presidents 
that  Cleveland’s  control  of  the  Democratic  party  in 
Congress  was  not  what  had  been  supposed,  and  the  cer- 
tainty that  a majority  of  the  members  of  the  Fifty- 
third  Congress  were  hostile  to  a repeal  of  the  silver 
law,  except  in  exchange  for  a larger  use  of  silver, 
involved  one  of  two  consequences — either  an  abandon- 
ment of  any  attempt  to  procure  a repeal  by  the  Fifty- 
third  Congress,  or  a resort  to  new  and  extraordinary 
measures. 

XI. 

But  neither  Mr.  Grover  Cleveland  nor  the  bankers 


THE  BANKERS’  CONSPIRACY 


15 


had  the  slightest  idea  of  abandoning  their  crusade 
against  the  silver  bill.  On  the  contrary,  the  determin- 
ation, both  of  Cleveland  and  the  National  Bank  presi- 
dents for  the  repeal  had  been  intensified  by  their  defeat 
in  the  Fifty-second  Congress.  They  resolved  upon  a 
resort  to  new  and  extraordinary  measures.  These  meas- 
ures may  be  summed  up  in  a single  sentence — a Na- 
tional Bank  war  upon  the  National  Industries,  Commerce 
and  Property. 

XII. 

Soon  after  the  second  inauguration  of  Grover  Cleve- 
land this  project  of  a National  Bank  war  upon  the  in- 
dustries and  commerce  of  the  country,  in  order  to  force 
the  repeal  of  the  silver  law,  was  under  discussion  in 
Wall  Street.  This  discussion  crystallized  early  in  April, 
if  not  even  in  March.  The  proof  of  this  is  a very  re- 
markable statement  publicly  made  on  the  18th  of  April, 
by  a responsible  hand  familiar  with  Wall  Street,  and 
undoubtedly  derived  from  Wall  Street  sources.  This  is 
the  most  important  of  the  “pre-Panic”  statements,  and 
is  valuable  in  its  relation  to  that  series  of  secret  Bank- 
arid-Cleveland  conferences  that  proceeded  in  such  swift 
succession  between  the  20th  and  27th  of  April,  inclu- 
sive, and  to  the  rapid  development  of  the  panic  imme- 
diately afterward. 

“It  is  supposed  by  many,”  said  the  writer  of  this  re- 
markable pre-Panic  statement,  “that  President  Cleve- 
land would  be  only  too  glad  to  have  some  financial 
trouble  befall  the  country,  because  it  would  justify  the 


16 


THE  BANKERS’  CONSPIRACY 


urgent  appeal  made  in  his  behalf  to  the  Democrats  of 
the  last  Congress,  and  would  support  him  in  appealing 
to  the  next  Congress,  for  proper  legislation”  (meaning 
by  “proper  legislation”  a repeal  of  the  silver  law). 
“But,”  continued  this  writer,  “such  an  impression 
must  do  the  president  injustice.  His  relations  to  busi- 
ness men  and  business  interests  are  such,  and  his 
knowledge  of  the  effects  of  financial  disaster  upon  the 
condition  and  happiness  of  the  millions  is  so  full,  that 
he  must  be  a man  of  exceedingly  callous  heart  to  re- 
gard with  satisfaction  a serious  financial  storm.” 

XIII. 

Those  men  who  want  trouble  usually  find  means  for 
making  it,  and  we  shall  now  see  how  immediately  up- 
on the  heels  of  the  foregoing  statement  Grover  Cleve- 
land and  the  New  York  National  Bank  presidents  joined 
forces  to  create  that  financial  trouble  believed  by  them 
to  be  necessary  to  support  an  appeal  to  the  Fifty-third 
Congress  for  the  repeal  of  the  silver  law.  “Financial 
trouble”  was  a mild  phrase  to  cover  that  immense  dis- 
turbance and  disaster  to  the  industry,  the  agriculture, 
the  commerce,  the  property  and  the  social  order  in- 
tended to  be  inflicted  upon  nearly  seventy  millions  of 
unsuspecting  people!  that  filled  the  land  with  loss, 
consternation  and  distress  during  the  year  beginning 
with  and  following  the  27th  of  April,  1898.  But  this 
enormous  prospective  social  and  industrial  disturbance 
and  suffering  did  not  in  the  least  appal  either  the  New 
York  National  Bank  presidents  or  Grover  Cleveland, 


THE  BANKERS’  CONSPIRACY 


17 


for  they  knew  that  of  the  bolts  about  to  fall  upon  the 
country  none  would  strike  them ! 

XIV. 

What  I allege  in  this  pamphlet  is  a criminal  conspi- 
racy between  New  York  National  and  other  bankers 
and  certain  Federal  officers  hereinafter  named,  which 
conspiracy  had  for  its  object  deliberate  extensive  in  jury 
to  the  agriculture,  the  industry,  the  commerce  and  the 
property  of  the  American  people,  and  to  alarm  and 
distress  their  minds — by  banking  operations — with  a 
view  to  coerce  them  and  their  representatives  in  Con- 
gress to  a particular  act,  to-wit:  The  repeal  of  the 
silver  act  of  July  14,  1890;  which  conspiracy  was  act- 
ually carried  into  effect  with  the  result  intended. 

XV. 

What  is  criminal  conspiracy? 

Criminal  conspiracy  is  a corrupt  combination  of  two 
or  more  persons,  by  concerted  action,  to  commit  a crim- 
inal or  unlawful  act,  or  an  act  not  in  itself  criminal  or 
unlawful,  by  criminal  or  unlawful  means,  or  an  act 
which  would  tend  to  prejudice  the  public  in  general, 
io  subvert  justice,  disturb  the  peace,  injure  public 
trade,  affect  public  health  or  violate  public  policy;  or 
any  act,  however  innocent,  by  means  neither  criminal 
nor  unlawful,  where  the  tendency  of  the  object  would  be 
to  wrongfully  coerce  or  oppress  either  the  public  or  an 
individual. 

There  can  be  no  doubt,  that  by  the  common  law,  all 


18 


THE  BANKERS’  CONSPIRACY 


such  confederacies  as  those  described  are  highly  crim- 
inal; and  it  is  sufficient,  to  constitute  the  offense,  if 
two  or  more  persons,  in  any  manner,  through  any  con- 
trivance— positively  or  tacitly — come  to  a mutual 
understanding  to  accomplish  a criminal  or  unlawful 
design;  the  gist  of  the  offense  being  the  fraudulent  and 
corrupt  combination  with  the  intent  that  injury  shall 
result.  The  agreement  may  be  express  or  implied;  the 
conspirators  need  not  even  be  acquainted  with  each 
other,  and  it  is  not  essential  that  any  but  the  leading 
conspirator  shall  know  the  exact  part  which  each  is 
to  perform.  The  common  design  is  the  essence  of  the 
crime  of  conspiracy,  and  it  is  not  necessary  to  prove 
that  the  persons  charged  came  together  and  actually 
agreed  in  terms  to  that  design,  and  to  pursue  it  by 
common  means.  If  they  pursued  by  their  acts  the 
same  object  often  by  the  same  means,  one  performing 
one  part  and  another  another  part  of  the  same,  so  as 
to  complete  it  with  a view  to  the  attainment  of  that 
same  object, the  jury  will  be  justified  in  the  conclusion 
that  they  were  engaged  in  a conspiracy  to  effect  that 
object.  All  confederates  in  a common  design,  of  which 
the  offense  of  conspiracy  is  a part,  are  principals; 
and  all  concerned  in  the  execution  of  the  common  pur- 
pose are  alike  guilty. 

An  accessory  before  the  fact  is  one  who,  being  absent 
at  the  time  the  crime  is  committed,  yet  procures,  coun- 
sels, encourages,  incites  or  commends  another  to  com- 
mit the  crime. 


THE  BANKERS’  CONSPIRACY 


19 


Conspiracy  is  a substantive  offense,  complete  in 
itself,  and  is  punishable  at  common  law,  although  noth- 
ing has  been  done  in  execution  of  its  purpose.  The  of- 
fense is  complete  when  the  confederacy  is  made;  if  overt 
acts  are  charged  in  the  indictment,  and  are  sustained 
by  proof,  such  acts  are  matters  of  aggravation,  or  evi- 
dences of  crime;  for  an  overt  act,  wherever  committed, 
is  a renewal  of  the  original  conspiracy  by  all  the  con- 
spirators. 

The  proof  of  conspiracy  may  be  direct  or  circum- 
stantial; the  joint  assent  of  minds,  like  all  other  parts 
of  a criminal  case,  may  be  established  by  an  inference 
of  the  jury  from  the  other  facts  proved.  As  a matter 
of  fact,  criminal  conspiracies  are  mostly  confederacies 
in  which  the  parties  are  pledged  or  sworn  to  secrecy; 
and  in  such  cases  proof  can  only  be  made  by  the  treach- 
ery of  participants  or  by  circumstantial  evidence; 
whence  it  is  that  there  is  no  occasion  to  prove  the  act- 
ual fact  of  the  conspiracy;  it  may  be  collected  from 
all  the  collateral  circumstances  of  the  case. 

(See  English  and  American  Encyclopedia  of  Law; 
Tomlin’s  and  Bouvier’s  Law  Dictionaries.) 

XVI. 

On  the  11th  of  April,  1893,  Grover  Cleveland  ap- 
pointed Conrad  N.  Jordan  to  be  Assistant  Treasurer  of 
the  United  States,  vice  E.  H Roberts,  resigned. 

The  sub-Treasury  at  New  York  is  a highly  important 
office.  It  is  the  great  business  establishment  of  the 
federal  government — it  is  one  of  the  Associated  Banks 


20 


THE  BANKERS’  CONSPIRACY 


of  New  York;  and  the  importance  of  its  functions  may 
be  estimated  when  it  is  known  that  its  aggregate  re- 
ceipts and  disbursements  in  the  three  fiscal  years,  1891, 
1892  and  1893,  were  more  than  seven  and  a half  thou- 
sands of  millions  of  dollars. 

Jordan’s  appointment  was  a conspicuous  departure 
from  Grover  Cleveland’s  publicly  announced  purpose, 
that  he  would  not  reappoint  ex-officeholders  of  his 
former  administration.  Of  these  Conrad  N.  Jordan 
was  one.  He  had  been  United  States  Treasurer  from 
June,  1885,  to  May,  1887,  when  he  resigned  to  become 
President  of  the  Western  National  Bank  of  New  York, 
an  institution  organized  principally  by  himself  and 
Secretary  Dan  Manning,  and  of  which  Manning  was 
president  at  the  time  of  his  death. 

But  if  Jordan’s  appointment  to  be  sub-Treasurer  was 
in  violation  of  one  of  Grover  Cleveland’s  principles  of 
official  action,  it  was  strictly  in  line  with  another — 
that  of  his  intended  use  of  the  federal  patronage  to 
force  the  repeal  of  the  silver  law.  Jordan  became — 
under  his  second  appointment — one  of  the  most  active 
and  efficient  of  the  federal  agents  of  that  repeal.  He 
became— under  his  second  appointment — the  confiden- 
tial intermediary  between  Grover  Cleveland  and  the 
New  York  National  Bank  presidents  in  their  joint-  ope- 
rations for  a National  Bank  war  upon  the  national  in- 
dustries, commerce  and  property;  and  doubtless,  his 
selection  was  made,  in  part  at  least,  with  this  function 
in  view.  He  was  well  known  to  Grover  Cleveland.  In- 


THE  BANKERS’  CONSPIRACY 


21 


deed,  he  was  Grover  Cleveland’s  personal  friend,  and 
the  New  York  National  Bank  presidents  had  unani- 
mously joined  in  recommending  him  for  the  sub-Treas- 
ury.  He  was  therefore  satisfactory  to  the  National 
Bank  presidents  and  to  the  other  bankers  of  New  York. 

XVII. 

Jordan  was  confirmed  on  April  15.  On  the  20th  and 
21sfc  he  was  in  Washington  with  his  bonds,  which  were 
duly  approved.  While  in  Washington  at  this  time  he 
had  repeated  interviews  with  Grover  Cleveland,  the 
character  of  which  is  easily  to  be  inferred  from  what 
followed.  It  is  enough  to  say,  in  this  place,  that  from 
the  hour  that  Jordan’s  bonds  were  approved,  events  of 
supreme  importance  to  the  American  people  moved 
with  an  astonishing  rapidity  between  Wall  Street  and 
the  White  House  through  the  agency  of  this  man.  His 
mission  as  confidential  mutual  friend  was  brief,  but 
was  full  of  evil. 

Jordan  returned  from  Washington  to  New  York  on 
Friday,  April  21,  and  arrived  in  the  latter  city  at  about 
5:30  in  the  afternoon.  He  went  directly  from  the  rail- 
way station  to  the  Chase  National  Bank,  15  Nassau 
Street,  where  his  coming  was  awaited  by  Henry  W. 
Cannon,  president  of  the  Chase  National,  and  J.  Ed- 
ward Simmons,  president  of  the  Fourth  National — two 
of  the  most  restless  and  active  of  the  ten  or  twelve  par- 
ticularly restless  and  active  men  who  constitute  the 
controlling  force  in  the  Associated  Banks,  and  who 
constitute  also  the  “New  York  National  Bank  Ring.” 


22 


THE  BANKERS’  CONSPIRACY 


A short-,  but  certainly  an  important  meeting  took 
place  between  these  three  men,  for  as  a consequence  of 
it  Cannon  went  to  Washington  on  a midnight  train. 
He  arrived  in  that  city  on  Saturday  morning,  April  22, 
and  stayed  there  until  Sunday  afternoon,  April  23,  in 
the  meantime  “interviewing”  with  Grover  Cleveland. 
It  was  alleged  that  he  carried  to  Washington  a propo- 
sition from  the  New  York  bankers,  but  “was  disin- 
clined to  talk,”  and  would  not  say  what  the  bankers’ 
proposition  was — whether  it  was  for  panic  or  something 
else;  although  he  was  willing  to  say,  that  “he  believed 
his  visit  would  bear  fruit.  ” In  view  of  what  passed 
betweQn  Cleveland  and  the  New  York  National  Bank 
presidents  within  the  next  six  or  seven  days,  in  all  of 
which  Cannon  was  most  actively  concerned,  it  is  quite 
certain  that  his  visit  did  bear  fruit,  such  as  it  was. 
XVIII. 

Jordan  was  sworn  into  office  Saturday  morning,  April 
22.  His  first  official  or  semi-official  act,  after  taking 
the  oath  of  office  and  then  possession  of  the  sub-Treas- 
ury,  was  to  arrange  a meeting  with  certain  National 
Bank  presidents  in  the  afternoon;  and  a meeting  took 
place  accordingly  in  the  Manager’s  Room  at  the  Clear- 
ing House — “Clearing  House”  being  the  high-sounding 
title  of  an  office  on  the  third  floor  of  the  Chase  Nation- 
al Bank  building,  in  which  the  daily  balances  due  to 
and  from  the  several  banks  belonging  to  the  Clearing 
House  are  ascertained — an  operation  usually  performed 
by  inferior  clerks,  and  effected  in  forty  to  sixty  minutes. 


THE  BANKERS’  CONSPIRACY 


23 


The  National  Bank  presidents  who  met  Jordan  on 
this  occasion  were  George  G.  Williams,  president  of  the 
Chemical  National;  Ebenezer  K.  Wright,  president  of 
the  Park  National;  George  F.  Baker,  president  of  the 
First  National ; Edward  H.  Perkins,  Jr.,  president  of 
the  Importers’  and  Traders’ National;  James  T.  Wood- 
ward, president  of  the  Hanover  National;  R.  M.  Gal- 
loway, president  of  the  Merchants’  National;  and  Wil- 
liam A.  Nash,  president  of  the  Corn  Exchange  (a  State) 
Bank.  This  meeting  was  said  to  have  been  informal, 
and  its  proceedings  were  secret;  both  Jordan  and  the 
bankers  refusing  to  give  any  information  about  it. 

But  it  was  an  important  meeting;  one  in  which,  for 
some  reason,  Grover  Cleveland  was  so  deeply  interested 
that  Jordan  went  to  Washington  on  a late  evening  train 
specially  to  make  report  of  its  proceedings.  He  went 
to  the  White  House  early  on  Sunday  morning,  and  had 
a long  conference  with  Grover  Cleveland,  at  which  Can- 
non was  present. 

XIX. 

Jordan  was  extremely  secretive  in  his  movements  at 
Washington  on  this  occasion — taking  a room  at  a hotel 
without  registering;  trying  also  to  escape  the  observa- 
tion of  the  newspaper  men,  in  which,  however,  he  does 
not  appear  to  have  been  wholly  successful.  Like  Can- 
non, he  would  not  talk;  he  refused  to  make  any  state- 
ment as  to  the  object  of  his  sudden  reappearance  at  the 
Capitol  within  forty-eight  hours  after  leaving  it  to  take 
possession  of  his  office  in  New  York.  But  it  was  al- 


24 


THE  BANKERS’  CONSPIRACY 


ready  observed  that  he  was  acting  as  the  “confidential 
mutual  friend”  of  Grover  Cleveland  and  the  New  York 
bankers;  and  it  was  also  observed  that,  for  some  unex- 
plained reason,  a sudden  excessive  secrecy  was  being 
practiced  as  to  matters  between  the  Treasury  and  the 
New  York  bankers  by  all  connected  with  the  depart- 
ment, “Mr.  Jordan,”  said  one  who  was  watchful  of 
passing  events,  “has  become  as  secretive  as  Mr.  Car- 
lisle.” 

XX. 

Jordan  and  Cannon  left  Washington  in  the  afternoon, 
and  arrived  back  at  New  York  late  in  the  evening  of 
Sunday,  April  23.  Before  leaving  Washington,  Jordan 
wired  certain  National  Bank  presidents  to  meet  him  at 
a private  house  uptown,  immediately  on  his  arrival; 
and  to  a man  the  National  Bank  presidents  responded. 
The  bankers  present  on  this  occasion  were  Henry  W. 
Cannon,  president  of  the  Chase  National  Bank;  J.  Ed- 
ward Simmons,  president  of  the  Fourth  National ; 
James  T.  Woodward,  president  of  the  Hanover  National ; 
and  Brayton  Ives,  president  of  the  Western  National. 
What  took  place  at  this  meeting  is  known  only  to  Con- 
rad N.  Jordan  and  the  participating  National  Bank 
presidents  and  their  confederates,  but  it  will  be  agreed 
that  it  must  have  been  a matter  of  extreme  interest,  or 
of  extreme  urgency,  or  both,  that  led  to  this  late  Sun- 
day night  council — and  it  goes  without  saying  that  this 
late  Sunday  night  council  was  a consequence  of  the  con- 
ference between  Cannon,  Jordan  and  Cleveland,  at  the 


THE  BANKERS’  CONSPIRACY 


25 


White  House  in  Washington  on  Sunday  morning.  It 
was  preliminary  to  a more  important  meeting  of  the 
bankers  on  the  next  day,  as  we  shall  now  see. 

XXI. 

On  Monday  morning,  April  24,  Jordan  was  early  at 
his  office  in  the  sub-Treasury.  He  had  exceedingly  im- 
portant business  in  hand;  for  his  reappearance  at  his 
desk  was  followed  by  an  immediate  notification  to  Na- 
tional Bank  presidents,  to  officers  of  trust  and  other  com- 
panies, to  members  and  representatives  of  the  great 
and  foreign  banking  houses,  and  to  private  bankers  in 
and  about  Wall  Street,  that  he  desired  them  to  meet 
him  at  the  sub-Treasury. 

XXII. 

The  bankers  responded  promptly;  and  from  the  hour 
that  Wall  Street  opened  for  business  that  morning  un- 
til after  the  lighting  of  lamps  and  gas  in  the  evening, 
the  sub-Treasurer’s  office  was  filled  with  bankers  com- 
ing and  going,  and  in  conference  with  each  other  and 
the  sub-Treasurer,  some  of  them  coming  and  going 
twice.  Conspicuous  among  these  latter  was  George  S. 
Coe,  president  of  the  American  Exchange  National 
Bank. 

XXIII. 

In  fact,  the  New  York  National  Bank  presidents  and 
their  confederates  were  holding  a general  convention — 
divided  into  sections,  so  to  speak;  or  conferences 
formal  and  informal.  The  formal  conferences  were 
between  Jordan  and  the  National  Bank  presidents;  at 


26 


THE  BANKERS’  CONSPIRACY 


which,  however,  ex-Secretary  of  the  Treasury  Charles 
S.  Fairchild  was  present  a part  of  the  time;  and  they 
lasted  from  half-past  ten  in  the  morning  until  nearly 
three  in  the  afternoon — after  which  began  a series  of 
informal  conferences,  that  lasted  until  late  in  the  even- 
ing. 

XXIV. 

The  early  forenoon  comers  were  the  National  Bank 
presidents  with  whose  names  the  reader  is  already  fa- 
miliar: Henry  W.  Cannon,  president  of  the  Chase  Na- 
tional; J.  Edward  Simmons,  president  of  the  Fourth 
National;  George  S.  Coe,  president  of  the  American 
Exchange  National;  Brayton  Ives,  president  of  the 
Western  National;  and  Charles  J.  Canda,  an  ex-Sub- 
Treasurer  at  New  York  and  a director  in  the  Western  Na- 
tional Bank.  These  men  arrived  at  about  half-past  ten. 
Ex-Secretary  Fairchild  joined  them  at  near  twelve 
o’clock— and  still  later,  at  about  one  o’clock,  other 
National  Bank  presidents  came  in.  These  were  Ebenezer 
K.  Wright,  president  of  the  Park  National;  George  G. 
Williams,  president  of  the  Chemical  National;  Fred- 
erick D.  Tappen,  president  of  the  Gallatin  National; 
James  Stillman,  president  of  the  National  City  Bank; 
James  T.  Woodward,  president  of  the  Hanover  Nation- 
al; Edward  H,  Perkins,  Jr.,  president  of  the  Importers’ 
and  Traders’  National;  and  George  F.  Baker,  president 
of  the  First  National.  These  National  Bank  presidents 
were  closeted  with  Jordan  until  near  three  o’clock  in 
the  afternoon,  when  they  retired. 


27 


THE  BANKERS*  CONSPIRACY 

They  were  succeeded  by  members  or  representatives 
of  the  great  foreign  banking  houses, among  them  August 
Belmont,  representative  of  the  American  business  of 
N.  M.  Rothschild  & Sons,  London;  next  came  a mem- 
ber of  Speyer  & Co.,  of  the  banking  house  of  Speyer 
Brothers,  London — followed  by  J.  Hood  Wright,  of 
Drexel,  Morgan  & Co. 

Then  came  officers  of  Trust  and  other  companies; 
among  them  one  Trenholm,  a former  Comptroller  of 
the  Currency — and  then  members  of  private  banking 
houses. 

In  short,  most  of  the  financial  magnates  in  and  about 
Wall  Street  participated  or  were  represented  in  this 
extraordinary  convention  at  some  time  during  the  day  or 
evening.  It  was  in  continuous  session  during  a period 
of  eight  or  nine  hours;  constantly  changing  in  mem- 
bership, however,  except  as  to  Jordan,  who  was  present 
from  beginning  to  end.  It  was  unprecedented  in  the 
history  of  “The  Street,”  and  its  most  extraordinary 
feature  was  that  every  banker  or  other  person  participat- 
ing was  pledged  to  secrecy;  and  the  historic  fact  is , that 
the  subject-matter  of  that  convention  is  as  completely  buried 
in  mystery  now  as  it  was  the  day  it  was  held , and  prob- 
ably it  never  will  be  known  until  it  is  wrung  from  the 
bankers  in  the  Courts  of  Justice . The  gravity  of  its  con- 
clusions is  indicated  by  the  fact  that  they  were  that 
night  sent  to  Grover  Cleveland  by  special  messenger. 

XXV. 

Although  a veil  of  secrecy  has  been  drawn  over  the 


THE  BANKERS’  CONSPIRACY 


proceedings  of  this  twenty-fourth  of  April  convention 
by  its  members,  it  is  not  in  the  least  difficult  to  pene- 
trate its  motives. 

This  Convention  was  called  for  the  purpose  of  collecting  the 
votes  of  the  National , and  other  hankers  in  and  about  Wall 
Street , upon  a proposition  to  assail  the  National  Industry, 
Agriculture , Commerce , Property  and  Social  Order  of  the 
American  People , the  assault  to  he  engineered  by  the 
New  York  National  Bank  presidents , as  the  swiftest  and 
surest  means  of  coercing  Congress  and  the  country  into  a 
repeal  of  the  Silver  Law ; with  the  result , that  the  practi- 
cally unanimous  vote  of  the  hankers  was  favorable  to  that 
assault. 

XXVI. 

It  is  not  conceivable,  and  it  is  in  the  highest  degree 
improbable,  that  the  nine  National  Bank  presidents 
who  met  John  G.  Carlisle  at  the  Williams  House  on 
April  27,  would  have  entered  upon  so  lawless  and  dan- 
gerous an  enterprise  as  an  industrial  and  commercial 
panic,  after  less  than  twenty  minutes’  talk  with  Car- 
lisle  on  the  subject,  if  they  had  not  first  been  fully 
assured  of  the  approval  and  cooperation  of  the  whole 
Wall  Street  gang.  This  implies,  of  course,  that  arrange- 
ments for  the  proposed  panic  were  made  on  April  24; 
and  the  promptness  with  which  the  National  Bank 
presidents,  who  were  to  engineer  it,  began  their  opera- 
tions after  the  meeting  with  Carlisle  on  the  27th,  is 
proof  that  the  preliminary  arrangements  actually  had 


THE  BANKERS’  CONSPIRACY 


29 


been  made  on  the  24th.  A further  implication  is  that 
the  conclusions  of  the  convention  were  sent  to  Cleve- 
land for  his  approval;  that  he  approved  them, and  that 
John  G.  Carlisle  met  the  National  Bank  presidents  at 
the  Williams  House  on  April  27  for  the  purpose  of 
communicating  that  approval;  the  Secretary  of  the 
Treasury  being  the  most  responsible  agent  who  could 
be  selected. 

XXVII. 

On  the  25th  of  April,  John  G.  Carlisle  wrote  to 
Jordan  that  he  would  be  in  New  York  at  10:30  in  the 
evening  of  the  next  day,  and  would  meet  the  bankers, 
apparently,  immediately  on  his  arrival.  This  letter, 
which  reached  Jordan  on  the  morning  of  the  26th,  led 
to  a conference  at  the  sub-Treasury  in  the  afternoon, 
between  Jordan,  J.  Edward  Simmons  of  the  Fourth 
National  Bank,  George  F.  Baker  of  the  First  National, 
and  Frederick  D.  Tappan  of  the  Gallatin  National,  to 
arrange  for  a reception  and  meeting  with  Grover  Clever 
land’s  Envoy-Extraordinary  on  April  27. 

XXVIII. 

Thursday,  April  27,  was  “Columbus  Day,” — a bank 
and  general  holiday  in  New  York;  the  day  of  the  great 
international  naval  review,  at  which  Grover  Cleveland 
and  his  cabinet  were  to  be  present.  This  was  a peculiar 
day  upon  which  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury  and  the 
National  Bank  presidents  were  to  meet,  but  a partic- 
ularly convenient  one  for  the  purpose. 


80 


THE  BANKERS5  CONSPIRACY 


Grover  Cleveland  and  his  party — including  Carlisle 
— arrived  according  to  program  at  10:80  in  the  even- 
ing of  the  26th.  Carlisle  was  met  at  the  railway  sta- 
tion by  Charles  J.  Canda,  who  accompanied  him  to  the 
Victoria  Hotel,  and  remained  with  him  until  a late 
hour  in  the  night. 

XXIX. 

About  half-past  four  o’clock  the  next  afternoon, — 
April  27 — the  public  exercises  of  the  day  being  over,  Mr. 
Carlisle  was  met  at  the  Victoria  Hotel  by  J.  Edward  Sim- 
mons. A carriage  had  been  provided,  in  which  Simmons 
and  Carlisle  were  driven  to  the  private  residence  of 
George  G.  Williams,  president  of  the  Chemical  National 
Bank,  where  nine  National  Bank  presidents  were 
assembled — as  follows: 

George  G.  Williams,  president  of  the  Chemical  Na- 
tional Bank;  Edward  H.  Perkins,  Jr.,  president  of  the 
Importers’  and  Traders’  National  Bank;  Frederick  D, 
Tappon,  president  of  the  Gallatin  National  Bank  (this 
man  has  been  described  as  “The  Bank  Dictator  of 
America;”  a portentous  title);  James  T.  Woodward, 
president  of  the  Hanover  National  Bank;  Bray  ton 
Ives,  president  of  the  Western  National  Bank;  Henry 
W.  Cannon,  president  of  the  Chase  National  Bank; 
George  S.  Coe,  president  of  the  American  Exchange 
National  Bank;  W.  W.  Sherman,  president  of  the  Na- 
tional Bank  of  Commerce;  J.  Edward  Simmons,  presi- 
dent of  the  Fourth  National  Bank.  Conrad  N.  Jordan 
and  Charles  J.  Canda  were  also  present 


THE  BANKERS’  CONSPIRACY 


31 


XXX. 

Carlisle  and  the  National  Bank  presidents  met  each 
other  with  an  effusive  cordiality.  There  were  mutual 
expressions  of  admiration  and  respect.  The  meeting 
was  marked  by  the  most  cordial  spirit  on  the  part  both 
of  the  Secretary  and  the  New  York  bankers.  . . The 

bankers  recognized  the  difficulties  of  Mr.  Carlisle’s  posi- 
tion, and  Carlisle,  in  his  turn,  thanked  the  bankers  for 
their  expressions  of  sympathy,  and  declared  that  they 
gave  him  more  pleasure  than  anything  that  had  hap- 
pened in  a long  time.  These  were  extremely  affecting 
preliminaries. 

XXXI. 

After  they  were  over,  “business”  being  in  order,  the 
National  Bank  presidents  proposed  an  issue  of  bonds, 
with  a view — as  they  professed — to  protect  the  public 
credit,  of  which,  it  appears,  these  National  Bank  pres- 
idents are  the  self-constituted  particular  custodians 
and  guardians.  But  the  National  Bank  presidents  per- 
fectly well  knew,  when  they  met  the  Secretary,  that 
there  was  to  be  no  issue  of  bonds;  and  their  proposition 
for  an  issue  was  intended  either  as  a blind  for  the  pub- 
lic as  to  the  motive  of  this  conference,  or  because  the 
New  York  National  Bank  presidents  never  come  within 
ear-shot  of  a federal  officer  of  any  rank  without  an  in- 
stant lunatic  paroxysm  for  an  issue  of  bonds. 

XXXII. 

Mr.  Carlisle,  in  his  reply  to  this  proposition  of  the 
National  Bank  presidents,  does  not  appear  to  have 


32 


THE  BANKERS’  CONSPIRACY 


dwelt  at  any  great  length  on  the  matter  of  a . bond 
issue.  He  expressed  his  strong  repugnance  to  an  issue 
of  bonds,  and  left  it  to  be  inferred  that  he  looked  upon 
an  issue  as  a last  resort.  The  subject-matter  really  in 
hand  was  the  repeal  of  the  silver  law,  and  he  expressed 
his  opposition  to  any  use  of  the  government  credit  that 
might  prove  an  impediment  to  repeal.  As  to  the  silver 
law, Mr.  Carlisle  was  sufficiently  hostile  to  it  to  satisfy 
even  the  malignant  National  Bank  presidents.  He 
assailed  it  with  great  bitterness.  There  was  apparently 
no  evil  in  the  body-politic  that  he  did  not  ascribe  to  the 
operation  of  that  law.  In  fact,  he  denounced  the  whole 
body  of  the  financial  and  currency  laws,  and  declared 
the  necessity  for  their  revision  and  reorganization — the 
beginning  of  which,  he  said,  must  be  the  early,  uncon- 
ditional and  absolute  repeal  of  the  silver  law. 

XXXIII. 

There  was  nothing  in  the  least  new,  or  at  all  start- 
ling, in  these  views  of  Mr.  Secretary  Carlisle.  The  early 
and  immediate  unconditional  repeal  of  the  silver 
law  had  been  a cry  of  the  New  York  National  Bank 
presidents,  raised  coincidently  with  the  passage  of  the 
law;  there  had  been  but  little  or  no  intermission  in  its 
repetition  since,  and  Grover  Cleveland,  both  by  persua- 
sions and  threats,  had  attempted  to  force  the  repeal  at 
the  second  session  of  the  Fifty-second  Congress.  But 
the  Secretary  now  made  a statement  so  alarming,  so 
atrocious  and  incendiary,  that,  if  the  National  Bank 
presidents  had  been  anything  but  what  they  were — 


THE  BANKERS’  CONSPIRACY 


38 


men  of  the  most  reckless  purposes,  with  whom  the  pro- 
posal to  commit  an  infamous  outrage  upon  the  people 
was  already  familiar— they  would  have  assailed  him 
with  indignant  protests  and  denunciations. 

XXXIV. 

But  the  West  and  the  South,  according  to  the  Secre- 
tary, and  as  was  the  fact,  were  against  the  repeal  of 
the  silver  law.  They  were  so  wedded  to  the  use  of  silver 
that  they  would  not  consent  to  the  repeal  except  in  ex- 
change for  free  coinage.  Grover  Cleveland  never  would 
consent  to  free  coinage.  He  was  unalterably  opposed 
to  free  coinage,  and  was  resolved  upon  the  repeal  of  the 
Sherman  law  with  as  little  delay  as  possible.  A 'prac- 
tical demonstration  to  the  business  men  of  the  South  and 
the  West  of  the  injurious  effects  of  that  law  upon  their 
trade  and  finances  might  be  necessary  to  convert  the  fanat- 
ics of  that  section  to  vote  for  the  repeal;  and  Grover  Cleveland 
had  come  to  the  conclusion  that  if  the  object  lesson  of  a panic, 
and  the  distress  that  monetary  stringency  would  cause , were 
necessary  to  secure  the  repeal , the  Administration  icould  do 
nothing  to  prevent  it  or  to  allay  alarm. 

XXXV. 

It  is  not  pretended  that  the  foregoing  were  the  exact 
words  used  by  Mr.  John  G.  Carlisle  in  his  address  to 
the  National  Bank  presidents,  but  they  convey  very 
succinctly  the  substance  of  what  he  said;  and  in  part  at 
least — those  with  respect  to  the  “object  lesson  of  a pan- 
ic”— are  so  nearly  his  words  that  to  distinguish  them 


34 


THE  BANKERS’  CONSPIRACY 


would  probably  be  difficult.  By  an  object  lesson  was 
meant  an  attack  by  the  New  York  National  Bank  presi- 
dents and  their  confederates,  by  banking  operations, 
upon  the  industrial  and  commercial  communities,  and 
most  particularly  those  of  the  South  and  West,  with  a 
design  to  disorganize  credit,  to  explode  banks,  to  shut 
down  mills  and  factories,  to  bankrupt  merchants,  to 
produce,  in  short,  by  banking  operations,  so  widespread 
and  intolerable  a state  of  business  and  social  disorder 
and  suffering  among  all  classes,  rich  and  poor,  as  to 
create  pressure  from  every  quarter  for  the  repeal  of  the 
silver  law — to  which  all  these  universal  ills  were  to  be 
systematically  ascribed. 

XXXVI. 

This  was  the  atrocious  scheme  of  outrage  and  spolia- 
tion of  the  industrial,  agricultural  and  commercial 
communities  wrapped  up  in  the  proposed  infamous 
“Object-Lesson.” 

XXXVII. 

Now,  did  any  one  of  the  nine  National  Bank  presi- 
dents, or  did  Conrad  N.  Jordan  or  Charles  J.  Canda, 
show  the  least  sign  of  astonishment,  alarm,  distress,  or 
even  surprise,  when  Mr.  Carlisle  made  his  astounding 
statement  that  a National  Bank  war  upon  the  national 
prosperity  was  approved  by  Grover  Cleveland? 

No. 

Did  any  one  of  the  nine  National  Bank  presidents, 
or  did  either  Conrad  N.  Jordan  or  Charles  J.  Canda, 
make  any  protest,  even  the  slightest,  that  a National 


THE  BANKERS5  CONSPIRACY 


35 


Bank  war  upon  the  industrial  and  commercial  commu- 
nities would  be  an  outrage  immeasurably  wicked,  cruel, 
indefensible,  infamous  and  criminal? 

No. 

Did  any  one  of  the  nine  National  Bank  presidents 
show  or  express  any  disinclination  whatever  to  join  in 
this  proposed  cruel,  infamous  and  criminal  National 
Bank  war  upon  the  industrial  and  commercial  com- 
munities? 

No. 

On  the  contrary,  the  nine  National-Bank  presidents 
and  Messrs.  Conrad  N.  Jordan  and  Charles  J.  Canda 
were  at  the  Williams  House  conference  in  the  expecta* 
tion  that  Mr.  Carlisle  would  make — at  least  in  sub- 
stance— precisely  the  delivery  that  he  did  make.  If 
any  proof  of  this  were  needed,  it  is  to  be  found  in  the 
fact  that,  within  twenty-five  minutes  after  that  delivery 
was  made,  the  conference  broke  up.  There  was  great 
harmony.  The  Secretary  of  the  Treasury,  the  nine  Na- 
tional Bank  presidents,  and  Messrs.  Conrad  N.  Jordan 
and  Charles  J.  Canda,  were  in  perfect  accord— they 
shook  hands  all  round— and  separated  as  effusively  as' 
they  had  met.  They  understood  each  other  perfectly, 
XXXVIII. 

This  meeting  lasted  about  one  hour,  and  was  the  last 
of  that  series  of  extraordinary  and  unprecedented  secret- 
bank  conferences  in  New  York,  and  confidential  Bank- 
Cleveland  communications  between  Wall  Street  and 
the  White  House,  that  had  been  in  progress  during 


THE  BANKERS’  CONSPIRACY 


seven  consecutive  days.  The  motive  for  their  contin- 
uance no  longer  existed.  The  preliminaries  had  all  been 
arranged.  The  conclusion  had  been  reached,  and  there 
would  be  no  more  meetings. 

XXXIX. 

An  immense  calamity  now  impended  over  the  Amer- 
ican people;  a calamity  that  was  to  break  upon  them 
within  the  next  forty-eight  hours. 

XL. 

Mr.  Carlisle  is  said  to  have  been  exceedingly  reticent 
about  what  had  passed  at  the  Williams ‘House  meeting. 
He  did  not  want  to  talk  about  it,  either  before  it  took 
place,  or  after  it  was  over.  He  adopted  a policy  of 
excessive  secrecy.  He  shrouded  all  his  movements  in 
mystery,  and  declined  to  see  newspaper  representatives. 
The  National  Bank  presidents  were  not  so  reserved. 
Crafty,  cowardly,  contemptible  and  disloyal,  in  their 
partnership  of  evil — gratified  at  the  prospect  of  mis- 
chief, but  shrinking  from  its  penalties,  they  promptly 
“squealed”  to  an  extent  that  revealed  their  purpose  to 
put  the  whole  responsibility  of  their  intended  crime 
upon  the  shoulders  of  Grover  Cleveland  and  his  Sec- 
retary of  the  Treasury 

XLI. 

The  National  Bank  presidents — everything  being  now 
arranged  and  understood — were  eager  for  the  assault; 
so  eager  that  one  of  them,  it  is  alleged,  went  directly 
from  the  Williams-House  meeting  to  a telegraphic  sta- 


THE  BANKERS’  CONSPIRACY 


37 


don  in  the  near  neighborhood,  and  began  operations 
within  thirty  minutes  after  it  had  adjourned.  It  is  en- 
tirely certain  that  within  twenty  hours  the  whole  New 
York  National  Bank  confederates  were  in  action,  with 
destructive  effect. 

XLIL 

At  the  time  of  this  meeting  between  the  Secretary  of 
the  Treasury  and  the  New  York  National  Bank  presi- 
dents, there  was  no  sign  of  the  coming  industrial  and 
commercial  storm  visible  anywhere  in  the  country; 
and  it  is  the  concurrent  testimony  of  the  commercial 
and  industrial  journals,  of  the  mercantile  agencies, 
and  of  important  political  men  of  both  the  great  par- 
ties, during  the  Extraordinary  Session  of  1893,  that 
the  industry  and  traffic  of  the  country  were  in  a sound 
and  conservative  state.  If  low  prices  and  small  profits 
are  a sign  of  soundness  and  conservatism,  then  the 
country  undoubtedly  was,  on  the  27th  of  April,  1893, 
in  an  eminently  satisfactory  condition. 

XLIII. 

But  within  one  month  after  that  meeting  the  New 
York  National  Bank  presidents  had  made  a startling 
change.  That  this  change  was  not  due  to  any  of  the 
ordinary  conditions  or  casualties  that,  produce  monetary 
storm,  Grover  Cleveland  has  voluntarily  testified 
“Our  unfortunate  financial  plight, ” said  that  person 
in  a message  sent  by  him  to  Congress  at  the  opening  of 
the  Extraordinary  Session,  on  August  7,  1893,  “is  not 
the  result  of  untoward  events,  nor  of  conditions  relat- 


38 


THE  BANKERS’  CONSPIRACY 


ing  to  our  natural  resources;  nor  is  it  traceable  to  any 
of  the  afflictions  which  frequently  check  national 
growth  and  prosperity.”  Grover  Cleveland  made  this 
statement  without  misgiving  of  any  kind* — for  he  knew 
absolutely  the  facts  whereof  he  spoke.  “With  plente- 
ous crops,”  he  continued,  “with  abundant  promise 
of  remunerative  production  and  manufacture;  with 
unusual  invitation  to  safe  investment,  and  with  satisfac- 
tory assurance  to  business  enterprise,  suddenly  finan- 
cial distrust  and  fear  have  sprung  up  on  every  side.” 

XLIV. 

Yes — by  conspiracy  and  treason,  financial  distrust 
and  fear  had  suddenly  sprung  up  on  every  side! 

XLV. 

According  to  the  bankers’  pregram,  the  projected 
object-lesson  was  to  begin  in  New  York  City— in  the 
Stock  Exchange.  It  did  so  begin— and  those  conditions 
of  activity  and  confidence  that  had  prevailed  in  the 
Exchange  at  the  close  cf  business  on  the  26th  of  April 
—the  27th  being  a bank  and  general  holiday — were 
wholly  reversed  within  forty-eight  hours  after  the  Wil- 
liams-House meeting  had  adjourned;  so  immediately 
— so  instantly,  indeed— did  the  conspiring  National 
Bank  presidents  begin  their  work  of  outrage  and  ruin ! 

XL  VI. 

But  it  was  not  until  Monday,  the  1st  of  May — four 
days  after  the  Williams-House  meeting — that  the  con- 
federated bankers  showed  their  infamous,  brutal  teeth 


THE  BANKERS’  CONSPIRACY 


39 


in  good  earnest,  when  they  made  an  attack  upon  Stock 
Exchange  prices,  that  was  kept  up  without  relaxation 
for  five  successive  days.  May  1,  2,  3,  4 and  5,  were 
days  of  a continuous  vindictive  calling  of  loans;  an 
extensive  and  merciless  sacrifice  of  collaterals,  and  of 
heavy  shrinkages  in  values,  with  resulting  collapse  and 
ruin  to  thousands  of  unfortunate  borrowers.  The  5th 
of  May  was  a day  of  immense  strain  and  danger,  which, 
for  some  hours,  was  of  the  most  threatening  character 
—arrested,  it  was  said,  in  part  at  least,  by  the  inter- 
ference of  W.  K.  Vanderbilt  and  Robert  Goelet.  The 
Herald , on  May  6,  devoted  an  entire  page  to  a descrip- 
tion of  the  Stock  Exchange  as  it  exhibited  itself  on  the 
5th  The  Tribune  of  the  same  date,  referring  to  the 
events  of  the  5th,  said:  uThe  enormous  losses  of  the 
last  week,  the  utter  demoralization  of  buying  power  in 
the  market,  and  the  practical  paralysis  of  credit, 
promised  a liquidation  that,  unless  stayed,  would  have 
swept  them  all  off  their  feet.” 

XLVIX. 

On  the  7th  of  May,  the  Tribune  made  this  further 
statement:  “The  effort  of  the  administration  to  bring  the 
South  and  the  West  to  a full  realization  of  the  inevitable 
consequences  of  compulsory  purchases  of  silver  bullion , has 
brought  distress  and  perhaps  ruin  to  many  innocent  per- 
sons'— but  there  is  no  reason  to  suppose  that  it  will  be  re- 
laxed. ” No — there  was  no  reason  to  suppose  that  the 
National  Bank  miscreants  were  going  to  relax  their 
infamous  system  for  even  one  moment. 


40 


THE  BANKERS*  CONSPIRACY 


XLVIII. 

While  these  operations  were  going  on  in  New  York, 
the  withdrawal  and  restriction  of  credits  had  begun  and 
were  going  forward  elsewhere;  and  by  means  of  that 
subtle  telegraphy  that  goes  from  bank  to  bank  and 
from  city  to  city,  preparations  for  the  great  storm, 
within  ten  days,  extended  from  the  Atlantic  to  the  Pa- 
cific. The  storm  broke  about  the  9th  of  May  by  the 
sudden,  unexpected  explosion  of  several  Western  banks; 
and  within  forty  days  thereafter,  the  National  Bank 
presidents  and  their  confederates  had  created  a state 
of  universal  excitement  and  consternation;  a condition 
that  illustrated,  at  the  same  moment,  the  enormous 
power  of  these  National  Bank  miscreants — their  abso- 
lute control  of  the  National  Banking  institutions  of  the 
country — and  the  relentless,  cold-blooded  cruelty  with 
which  they  put  their  power  and  control  into  action. 

XLIX. 

“There  is  no  lack  of  pressure,”  said  the  New  York 
Tribune  on  the  22d  of  May — referring  to  the  disas- 
trous course  of  events  above  described,  and  perfectly 
informed  of  the  continued  operations  of  the  National 
Bank  presidents  to  distress  and  ruin  business  men  of 
the  South  and  the  West  in  order  to  force  a repeal  of  the 
silver  law — “there  is  no  lack  of  pressure.”  There  was 
no  lack  of  pressure,  indeed.  “Pressure”  was  visible 
everywhere  in  the  hourly-increasing  panic  and  prostra- 
tion of  the  country — in  the  midst  of  which  the  National 


THE  BANKERS’  CONSPIRACY 


41 


Bank  presidents  were  steadily  at  work  with  a fierce 
brutality  absolutely  indescribable  and  wholly  appalling 
— striking — striking — striking — 

L. 

On  the  seventh  of  June — six  weeks  after  the 

Williams-House  meeting — the  New  York  Sun  in  its 
money  article,  said,  among  other  things,  that, 

“The  presidents  of  the  New  York  banks  think  that 
the  so-called  Object-Lesson  has  been  carried  far  enough,” 
. . . and  that  . . . “they  see  nothing  to  be 

gained  by  a further  shrinkage  in  values  and  unset- 
tling of  credits.” 

LI. 

The  National  Bank  presidents,  secure  in  their  mar- 
ble and  granite  castles  in  and  about  Wall  Street,  were 
of  opinion,  then,  on  the  7th  of  June,  1893,  that  their 
so-called  Object-Lesson  had  been  carried  far  enough, 
and  that  enough  shrinkage  of  values  and  unsettling  of 
credits  had  been  effected  to  justify  them  in  taking  a 
brief  rest  from  their  infernal  labors.  They  had  pro- 
duced immense  effects,  as  was  witnessed  in  the  paraly- 
sis of  industry  and  commerce  everywhere  throughout 
the  nation.  They  had  exploded  banks;  they  had  closed 
mills  and  factories,  until  multitudes  of  men  and  women 
were  out  of  employ — many  of  them  hungry  and  a'l  of 
them  in  distress — and  they  had  bankrupted,  and  were 
bankrupt  r?  merchants  and  manufacturers  on  every 
side.  The  South  and  West  were  being  educated!  edu- 


42 


THE  bankers’  conspiracy 


cated  by  disaster  and  ruin  deliberately  inflicted.  The 
South  and  the  West — the  tributary  sections — were  being 
taught  that  they  have  a Master  in  Wall  Street! 

LII. 

Apparently  the  National  Bank  anarchists  were  tired. 
But  they  were  not.  They  were  merely  resting,  if  indeed 
they  were  even  resting.  Evidently  the  country  was  not 
yet  ready  for  capitulation;  there  was  much  yet  to  be 
done  before  it  was  fully  ripe  for  that  projected  extra 
session  of  Congress  that  was  to  score  their  victory  over 
the  rebellious  South  and  West — and  the  bankers 
wrought  on.  Moreover,  they  were  waiting  for  the  ac- 
tion of  British  confederates. 

Lin. 

By  the  30th  of  June  the  culmination  had  been 
reached.  From  that  date  onward  to  the  middle  of 
October,  THE  NEW  YORK  NATIONAL  BANK  PRES- 
IDENTS’ WAR  UPON  THE  NATIONAL  PROSPER- 
ITY was  tremendously  at  its  flood;  raging  in  the  South, 
the  West  and  the  Northwest  with  overwhelming  force, 
and  powerfully  disturbing  also  the  Middle,  the  Eastern 
and  the  Northeastern  States — thus  fulfilling,  in  all  its 
parts,  the  Williams-House  program. 

LIV. 

The  condition  of  the  country,  on  the  30th  of 
June,  was — as  above  stated — one  of  immense  storm  and 
stress;  greatly  aggravated,  as  respected  the  silver  ques- 
tion, by  a sudden  blow  from  an  unexpected  quarter 


}PHE  BANKERS*  CONSPIRACY 


48 


This  was  the  closure  of  the  British-Indian  Mints,  by  an 
order  of  the  Indian  Government  on  June  25,  against 
the  further  free  coinage  of  silver;  and  the  fixing  of  a 
rate  of  British-Indian  exchange,  which  had  for  its  ob- 
ject a further  depression  in  the  price  of  silver  bullion. 

LV. 

This  attack  upon  silver  by  the  British-Indian  govern- 
ment— with  which  the  people  of  India  had  absolutely 
nothing  whatever  to  do;  against  which,  indeed,  they 
earnestly  protested;  with  which  ninety-nine  hundredths 
of  the  British  people  had  nothing  to  do,  and  which  was 
opposed  to  the  best  interests  both  of  Great  Britain  and 
her  Indian  Empire,  as  events  have  proved,— was  re- 
ceived by  Wall  Street,  its  allies,  its  mercenaries  and 
panderers,  in  Congress  and  out,  with  a yell  of  exul- 
tation. The  Tribune  announced  the  news  in  startling 
headlines:  “A  blow  at  silver  values.  The  action  of  In- 
dia severely  depresses  the  white  metal,  stimulating 
repeal  sentiment.  The  silver  men  are  dumb.”  Some 
of  the  silver  men  were,  indeed,  stricken  with  a kind  of 
paralysis;  but  does  any  man,  in  the  possession  of  his 
senses,  suppose  that  this  closure  of  the  Indian  mints 
against  silver  was  accidental  at  this  time?  That  this 
action  of  the  British  confederates  of  Wall  Street  did 
stimulate,  and  was  intended  to  stimulate,  the  repeal 
sentiment,  admits  of  no  doubt  whatever.  It  was  a part 
of  the  most  extended  conspiracy  in  the  history  of  the 
nations. 

It  was  at  this  moment  of  storm  and  stress  every- 


44 


THE  BANKERS5  CONSPIRACY 


where  throughout  the  country,  when  the  sudden  unex- 
pected reinforcement  of  the  New  York  National  Bank 
assassins  by  their  British  allies  was  calculated  power- 
fully to  influence  the  public  sentiment  of  the  American 
people  to  their  designs,  that,  on  June  30, Grover  Cleve- 
land issued  his  call  for  an  Extraordinary  Session  of 
Congress,  to  meet  on  the  7th  of  August  following — uTo 
the  end,”  said  that  person,  “that  the  people  may  be  re- 
lieved through  legislation  (meaning  the  repeal  of 
the  silver  law)  from  the  present  and  impending  danger 
and  distress.” 

Congress  met  accordingly  on  the  7th  of  August,  and 
after  three  months  of  hot  debate  and  varying  fortunes, 
passed  an  act  for  the  repeal  of  the  purchase  clause  of 
the  silver  law,  which  went  into  effect  on  November  1. 


THE  CONSPIRACY  IN  ACTION. 


I. 

I have  shown,  in  the  preceding  pages,  how  within 
fifteen  hours  after  the  meeting  of  Carlisle  and  the  nine 
National  Bank  presidents-  at  the  house  of  George  G. 
Williams,  on  the  afternoon  of  April  27,  the  conspiring 
National  Bank  presidents,  on  the  next  morning,  April 
28,  made  a terrific  onslaught  upon  the  New  York  Stock 
Exchange.  I now  propose  a brief  chronology,  showing 
the  progress  of  the  devastation  and  ruin  wrought  by  the 
assassin  National  Bankers;  for  the  sake  of  consecu- 
tive statement,  beginning  with  that  attack,  and  ending 
on  June  80,  sixty-five  days  later;  with  a record  of  more 
than  fifty  banks  and  savings  institutions  wrecked  by 
their  operations  between  the  20th  and  30th  days  (inclu- 
sive) of  that  month. 

II. 

This  Williams-House  meeting  took  place  on  Thurs- 
day, April  27,  between  half-past  five  and  half-past 
six  o’clock  in  the  afternoon. 

On  the  next  morning,  Friday,  April  28,  the  bank 
presidents  attacked  the  New  York  Stock  Exchange. 
The  stock  market,  said  the  Tribune  on  April  30,  during 

four  days  of  the  week,  displayed  remarkable  strength 

45 


46 


THE  BANKERS’  CONSPIRACY 


and  courage,  but  the  upward  movement  culminated  on 
Friday  morning — fifteen  hours  after  the  Williams- 
House  meeting — and  during  the  last  two  days,  April  28 

and  29,  was  reversed . 

April  30  was  Sunday. 

Monday,  Mayl — Four  days  after  the  Williams-House 
meeting:  the  National-Bank  presidents  renewed  their 
attack  upon  the  Exchange,  by  a vindictive  calling  of 
loans  and  refusal  of  credits.  “This,”  said  the  Times , 
“was  a day  of  gloom  and  despondency  on  the  Stock 
Exchange;”  “a  day  of  severe  calling  of  loans  by  the 
banks;  a day  of  heavy  shrinkages.” 

Tuesday,  May  2 — five  days  after  the  Williams-House 
meeting:  “ The  market,”  said  the  Times , Continued 
to  decline.” 

Wednesday,  May  3 — six  days  after  the  Williams- 
House  meeting:  “The  excitement  ran  high,”  said  the 
Times , “and  scenes  were  enacted  in  the  Stock  Exchange 
characteristic  of  a day  when  the  bottom  appeared  to 
have  dropped  out  of  half  the  market.” 

Thursday,  May  4 — one  week  after  the  Williams-House 
meeting:  “There  was  a further  break,”  said  the  Times. 
“and  the  excitement  was  even  greater  than  on  yester- 
day.” 

Friday,  May  5 — eight  days  after  the  Williams-House 
meeting:  “This,”  said  the  Tribune , “was  a day  of 
terrible  strain.  The  Stock  Exchange  trembled.  . . . 

The  enormous  losses  within  the  last  week — the  utter 
demoralization  of  buying-power  in  the  market,  and  the 


THE  BANKERS’  CONSPIRACY 


47 


practical  paralysis  of  credit,  promised  a liquidation 
that— unless  stayed — would  have  carried  them  all  off 
their  feet.”  The  Herald , on  May  6,  devoted  a whole 
page  to  the  Stock  Exchange  as  it  appeared  on  the  5th. 
— Dispatches  from  Washington,  printed  in  the  Times , 
stated  that  “ Cleveland  and  Carlisle  had  heard  of  the  ex- 
citement in  the  Stock  Exchange  with  great  composure.  ” 
There  was  nothing  in  the  least  unexpected  to  them  in 
the  loss  and  ruin  the  assassin  National  Bank  presidents 
were  dealing  among  the  brokers  and  their  patrons. 

Saturday,  May  9.— The  confederated  Bank  presidents 
“let  up”  somewhat  on  this  day,  and  “the  worst,”  it 
was  said,  “was  over.” 

May  7 was  Sunday. 

Tuesday,  May  9.— Twelve  days  after  the  Williams- 
House  meeting  — A cordage  factory  in  Brooklyn,  as  a 
consequence  of  the  attack  upon  the  Stock  Exchange,  was 
closed,  and  five  hundred  men,  women,  and  young  per- 
sons were  suddenly  thrown  out  of  work.  This  was  the 
first  victory  of  the  National  Bank  presidents  over  the 
working  men,  women  and  young  people  of  the  country. 
But  it  wras  not  their  last.  Within  sixty  days  multi- 
tudes were  in  idleness  and  distress;  and  daily,  and  al- 
most hourly,  after  the  middle  of  July,  the  journals 
were  filled  with  staring  headlines  announcing  the  tri- 
umphs of  the  National  Bank  presidents.  Here  are  some 
of  them  taken  from  the  Tribune : 

July  25. — “Pennsylvania  mills  suddenly  closed.” 

July  26.— “Eastern  factories  shutting  down.  Work- 
men suffering  from  hunger.” 


48 


THE  BANKERS’  CONSPIRACY 


July  27. — “Feeding  the  hungry  in  Denver.” 

July  28. — “Sad  news  for  working  men.  Thousands  of 
them  thrown  out  of  work,  or  compelled  to  accept 
reduced  wages.” 

July  29. — “Thousands  of  men  out  of  work.  Mills 
and  mines  closing  all  over  the  country.” 

July  30. — “Suspensions  and  curtailments  in  estab- 
lishments great  and  small.” 

August  2. — “Workmen  everywhere  depressed.” 

August  4. — “Fall  River  mills  closed;  700,000  spindles 
idle.” 

“Destitute  workmen  in  Cleveland.” 

This  kind  of  quotations  might  be  made  sufficient  to 
fill  a volume.  They  wrere  delightful  reading  for  the 
National  Bank  presidents,  their  allies  and  mercenaries 
— for  every  man,  woman  and  youth,  driven  from  labor 
to  anxiety  and  want,  was  a new  triumph  for  “sound 
finance.” 

III. 

It  was  upon  this  day,  May  9,  that  the  operations  for 
injury  to  the  South  and  West  began  to  take  effect,  and 
to  show  themselves  in  the  explosion  of  banks,  and  the 
failure  or  suspension  of  merchants,  traders  and  manu- 
facturers, in  various  quarters.  The  chronology  that 
follows  is  confined  almost  wholly  to  the  effects  on  bank- 
ing institutions: 

Tuesday,  May  9. — Twelve  days  after  the  Williams- 
House  meeting. — The  Chemical  National  Bank  of  Chi- 
cago failed.  A Michigan  Savings  Bank  failed. 


THE  BANKERS’  CONSPIRACY 


49 


Wednesday,  May  10. — Thirteen  days  after  the  Wil- 
liams-House meeting. — The  Columbia  National  Bank 
of  Chicago  and  the  Capital  National  Bank  of  Indian- 
apolis failed.  A private  bank  in  Wisconsin  and  another 
in  Delaware  failed. 

Thursday,  May  11. — Two  weeks  after  the  Williams- 
House  meeting.— Many  banks  closed  their  doors  on  this 
day — four  State  banks  in  Indiana  and  one  in  Georgia; 
eight  private  banks — four  in  Indiana,  three  in  Ohio, 
and  one  in  Wisconsin — thirteen  in  all — failed. 

May  13.— Three  more  private  banks — one  in  Ohio, 
one  in  Indiana  and  one  in  Florida — failed. 

May  14. — Eight  more  banks  gave  way  under  sudden 
pressure:  A private  bank  in  Illinois,  one  in  Colorado 
and  another  in  Michigan;  two  State  banks  in  Indiana, 
two  in  Minnesota,  and  one  in  South  Carolina,  closed 
their  doors 

May  16.— A State  bank  in  Indiana;  a National  Bank 
in  Iowa;  a private  bank  in  Ohio  and  another  in 
Indiana,  failed. 

May  18.— The  Exchange  Bank,  Bloomington,  Illi- 
nois; the  First  National  and  the  Oglethorpe  National 
Banks,  Brunswick,  Georgia;  the  Evanston  National, 
Evanston,  Illinois;  Citizens’  Bank,  Minneapolis;  two 
private  banks  in  Michigan,  a private  bank  in  Indiana, 
and  another  in  Illinois — nine  in  all — closed  their  doors. 

May  20. — A State  bank  in  Georgia,  a Loan  and  Trust 
Company  in  Minnesota,  and  two  private  banks  in  In- 
diana, failed. 


50 


THE  BANKERS’  CONSPIRACY 


May  22. — The  National  Bank  of  Elmira,  New  York, 
and  a private  bank  in  Michigan,  failed. 

May  24. — The  National  Bank  of  Deposit,  New  York, 
failed. 

May  26. — A private  bank  in  Michigan  and  another 
in  Ohio;  a State  bank  in  Ohio  and  one  in  Georgia  were 
forced  under. 

May  80. — Two  private  banks  in  Iowa;  one  in  Arkan- 
sas; a National  Bank  in  Georgia,  and  two  in  Dakota 
closed  their  doors. 

IV. 

The  record  for  twenty-one  days  in  May — from  the  9th 
to  the  30th,  inclusive — was  sixty  banks  exploded  in 
fourteen  different  states,  stretching  from  Florida  to 
Dakota!  fifty-eight  in  the  doomed  sections — the  South, 
the  West  and  the  Northwest. 

V. 

The  record  for  June  shows  that  in  that  month  the 
number  of  banks  exploded  was  twice  that  of  May; 
which  was  partly  due,  however,  to  the  extreme  con- 
sternation and  excitement  that  had  now  been  created 
in  all  quarters  of  the  country,  and  which  led  to  a with- 
drawal of  cash  funds  by  bank  depositors. 

VI. 

June  1. — A State  bank  in  Wisconsin  and  a National 
Bank  in  Washington  failed. 

June  2. — Two  private  banks — one  in  Illinois  and  one 
in  Ohio — failed. 


THE  BANKERS’  CONSPIRACY 


51 


June  4. — “A  crash  in  Chicago” — Meadowcroft  Broth- 
ers failed.  Two  National  Banks  in  North  Dakota  and 
a private  bank  in  Illinois,  failed. 

June  6. — Ten  banks  collapsed  this  day:  An  Ohio 
savings  bank  closed  its  doors.  A National  Bank  in 
Texas.  Three  private  banks— one  in  Michigan,  one  in 
Wisconsin  and  one  in  Washington— suspended.  A sav- 
ings bank,  three  National  banks,  and  a State  bank,  in 
Washington,  were  forced  under. 

June  7. — Two  State  banks  in  Indiana;  a savings 
bank  in  Ohio  and  another  in  Wisconsin;  a private  bank 
in  Illinois  and  a State  bank  in  Nebraska  failed. 

June  9. — A private  bank  and  two  savings  banks  failed 
in  Wisconsin;  two  private  banks  in  Illinois  and  one  in 
Alabama  went  down. 

June  10. — A State  bank  in  Iowa;  a private  bank  in 
Georgia  and  another  in  Washington,  failed 

June  12. — A State  bank  in  Michigan  and  one  in  Utah; 
a private  bank  in  Ohio  and  a private  bank  in  Kansas, 
closed  their  doors. 

June  13,  14. — A savings  bank  in  Nebraska,  a sav- 
ings bank  in  Tennessee,  a State  bank  in  Washington,  a 
State  bank  in  Indiana,  a State  bank  in  California,  and 
a private  bank  in  Ohio,  were  forced  under. 

June  15,  16. — UA  Kansas  bank  goes  down.”  A Na- 
tional Bank  in  Iowa,  and  another  in  Ohio,  failed.  A 
State  bank  in  Minnesota,  a State  bank  in  Ohio,  a pri- 
vate bank  in  Kansas,  and  a private  bank  in  Oregon, 
failed. 


U.  OF  fLL.  LIB. 


52  THE  bankers’  conspiracy 

June  17,  19. — A savings  bank  in  Tennessee  ; two  State 
banks  in  North  Carolina;  a State  bank  in  California; 
two  private  banks,  a National  Bank  and  a State  bank 
in  Oregon,  failed. 

June  20. — Nine  banks  was  this  day’s  record.  “A 
North  Carolina  bank  suspends.”  A private  bank  in 
Ohio  and  another  in  Oregon,  failed.  A savings  bank 
in  Tennessee;  two  State  banks  in  California  and  a State 
bank  in  Minnesota,  failed.  Two  National  Banks  in 
California  went  under. 

June  21,  22 —“Banks  still  shutting  down.”  “Pri- 
vate bankers  at  Buffalo  assign.”  Eleven  California 
State  banks  and  four  California  National  Banks,  sus- 
pended. A State  bank  in  Missouri;  a savings  bank  in 
Ohio;  a private  bank  in  New  York  and  another  in 
Pennsylvania,  all  stopped  business.  Twenty  establish- 
ments in  two  days! 

June  23  — A National  Bank  in  Indiana;  a National 
Bank  in  California;  a savings  bank  in  California;  a 
State  bank  in  Minnesota,  another  in  Ohio,  a third  in 
California,  a fourth  in  New  York,  failed. 

June  24. — A State  bank  in  Kansas;  a National  Bank 
in  Washington,  and  a savings  bank  in  California  failed. 

June  26. — “More  Western  banks  go  under.”  “An- 
other Buffalo  bank  suspends.  ” A State  bank  in  Cali- 
fornia, and  another  in  New  York,  are  closed.  A private 
bank  in  Ohio;  a private  bank  in  Minnesota  and  an- 
other in  Georgia,  are  forced  under. — News  was  received 
of  the  closure  of  the  Indian  Mint  against  the  free  coin- 


THE  BANKERS’  CONSPIRACY 


53 


age  of  silver  by  orderof  the  British-Indian  government; 
a movement  clearly  in  confederation  with  the  New 
York  National  Bank  presidents’  panic  operations  against 
the  silver  in  the  United  States. 

June  27,  28. — A private  bank  in  Illinois;  a private 
bank  in  Montana;  three  private  banks  in  Minnesota 
and  one  in  New  York;  a State  bank  in  Minnesota;  a 
State  bank  in  Pennsylvania ; a Loan  and  Trust  Company 
in  Minnesota ; a Loan  and  Trust  company  in  Iowa — ten 
in  all — went  down. 

June  30. — Three  more  banks  close  their  doors;  and 
Grover  Cleveland  called  an  Extraordinary  Session  of 
Congress  to  meet  on  August  7 following:  “To  the  end,” 
as  he  alleged,  “that  the  people  might  be  relieved  through 
legislation  (meaning  a repeal  of  the  silver  law)  from 
the  present  and  impending  danger  and  distress.” 

VII. 

Without  further  pursuing  in  detail  the  daily 

effects  of  the  New  York  National  Bank  presidents’  Na- 
tional Bank  war  upon  the  business  and  property  of  the 
country — which  was  continued  with  little  or  no  abate- 
ment till  the  middle  of  October — the  general  results  at 
the  end  of  the  year  may  be  briefly  summed  up: 

Between  April  27 — the  day  of  the  Williams-House 
meeting — and  the  30th  of  December,  1893,  a period  of 
eight  months,  more  than  fifteen  thousand  bankruptcies 
and  suspensions  of  commercial  and  industrial  concerns 
and  companies  had  taken  place;  and  more  than  six 
hundred  banking  institutions  and  banking  firms  had 


54 


THE  BANKERS’  CONSPIRACY 


been  seriously  injured  or  were  wholly  ruined.  The 
total  amount  involved  in  the  bankruptcies  and  suspen- 
sions of  all  these  firms,  companies  and  institutions, 
during  these  eight  months,  was,  roundly,  Seven  Hun- 
dred and  Fifty  Millions  of  Dollars! — a vast  sum,  that 
exceeded  “the  record”  in  any  previous  entire  year  in 
the  history  of  the  country  by  more  than  Five  Hundred 
Millions  of  Dollars ! and  that  exceeded  the  bankruptcies 
and  suspensions  of  1892  by  Six  Hundred  and  Thirty- 
Five  Millions!  Twelve  hundred  millions  of  railroad 
property  was  during  that  period  forced  into  the  hands 
of  receivers,  and  Wall  Street  looters.  Three  millions  of 
men,  women,  and  young  persons,  who  were  contentedly 
at  work  in  the  shops,  factories  and  mills  on  the  27th 
of  April,  1893,  were  out  of  work  on  the  1st  of  January, 
1894;  all  of  them  in  more  or  less  anxiety  and  distress, 
and  many  of  them  hungry  and  suffering.  What  the 
whole  sum  of  sacrifice  by  labor  has  been,  by  reason  of 
the  National  Bank  assassins’,  war  upon  industry,  it  is 
impossible  accurately  to  measure;  but  the  New  York 
Tribune  said,  on  the  29th  of  April,  1894,  that  “labor 
had  been  compelled  to  sacrifice  from  its  earnings,  in 
one  year,  a sum  about  as  great  as  the  entire  national 
debt  created  by  a four  years’  rebellion.”  What  the 
country  lost  in  its  whole  business  operations  may  be 
stated  with  approximate  accuracy.  In  the  eight  months 
between  April  27,  1893,  and  January  1,  1894,  it  had 
been  diminished — as  was  shown  by  the  Clearing  House 
exchanges,  as  compared  with  the  immediately  preceding 


THE  BANKERS’  CONSPIRACY 


55 


period  of  eight  months — by  more  than  seven  thousand 
millions  of  dollars!  (and  within  fifteen  months  after 
the  27th  of  April,  1898,  by  more  than  ten  thousand 
millions!) 

VIII. 

These  were  the  immediately  visible  stupendous 
changes  wrought  in  the  business  and  social  state  of  the 
American  people,  between  the  27th  of  April  and  the  1st 
of  January,  1894,  by  the  New  York  National  Bank 
assassins;  changes  without  parallel  in  the  history  of 
any  nation  in  a time  of  peace.  If  it  were  possible  to 
present  in  any  point  of  view  the  whole  sum  of  the  evil 
and  loss  wrought  upon  the  people  by  those  men,  it 
would  be  an  appalling  spectacle.  In  proof  of  this,  I 
call  a competent  witness — George  G.  Williams,  pres- 
ident of  the  Chemical  National  Bank.  At  a meeting  of 
New  York  bankers,  in  the  manager’s  office  of  the  Clear- 
ing House,  on  the  19th  of  June  1894,  which  was  not  se- 
cret, this  man  made  the  astounding  statement,  that  he 
believed  seventy-five  per  cent  of  the  manufacturing  and 
commercial  business  of  the  country  to  be,  at  that  mo- 
ment, in  the  balance  between  solvency  and  insolvency! 

IX. 

Resuming  now  the  thread  of  the  narrative  of  events 
consequent  upon  the  operations  of  the  National  Bank 
assassins,  Congress  met  on  August  7,  pursuant  to  Grover 
Cleveland’s  summons,  and  that  person  submitted  a 
message  in  which  he  said,  among  other  things,  that, 


56 


THE  BANKERS’  CONSPIRACY 


“The  existence  of  an  alarming  and  extraordinary 
business  situation,  involving  the  welfare  and  prosperity 
of  all  our  people,  has  constrained  me  to  call  together 
in  extra  session  the  people’s  representatives.  . . . 

Our  unfortunate  financial  plight  is  not  the  result  of 
untoward  events,  nor  of  conditions  related  to  our  nat- 
ural resources;  nor  is  it  traceable  to  any  of  the  afflic- 
tions which  frequently  check  national  growth  and  pros- 
perity. With  plenteous  crops,  with  abundant  promise 
of  remunerative  production  and  manufacture,  with 
unusual  invitation  to  safe  investment,  and  with  satis- 
factory assurance  to  business  enterprise,  suddenly 
financial  distrust  and  fear  have  sprung  up  on  every 
side.” 

Grover  Cleveland  knew  precisely  whereof  he  spoke. 
Washington,  August  11. — William  L.  Wilson,  of  West 
Virginia,  an  agent  of  Grover  Cleveland’s,  introduced 
into  the  House  of  Representatives  a bill  for  the  repeal 
of  the  purchase  clause  of  the  silver  law,  which, 

August  28, — Was  passed  by  a vote  of  289  yeas  to  109 
noes;  5 members  not  voting.  Of  the  noes  85  were  Dem- 
ocrats and  Populists,  and  24  were  Republicans,  and, 
August  29, — D.  W.  Voorhees,  of  Indiana,  reported  the 
House-bill  in  the  Senate,  with  an  amendment  to  the 
effect  that  the  efforts  of  the  Government  should  be 
steadily  directed  to  a system  of  bimetallism  that  would 
maintain  at  all  times  the  equal  power  of  all  dollars 
issued  by  the  United  States  in  the  payment  of  debts. 
This  bill  was  debated  in  the  Senate  during  the  whole 
of  September  and  October. 


THE  BANKERS’  CONSPIRACY 


57 


X. 

October  20. — The  repeal  bill  was  passed  in  the  Sen- 
ate by  48  yeas  to  82  noes.  Of  the  yeas  20  were  Demo- 
crats and  23  were  Republicans.  Of  the  noes  19  were 
Democrats,  9 were  Republicans  and  4 were  Populists, 

XI. 

November  1. — The  House  took  up  the  Senate  amend- 
ment, and  passed  it  at  3:10  p.  m.  The  bill  was  imme- 
diately sent  to  Grover  Cleveland,  and  became  law  by 
his  signature  at  4:30  p.  m. 

At  this  moment — 4:30  p.  m.,  November  1,  1893 

— the  New  York  National  Bank  presidents  were  tri- 
umphantly in  the  ascendant. 


HAS  THE  COUNTRY  LEARNED  ANYTHING? 

I. 


The  New  York  Tribune  on  the  25th 

of  November,  1893,  contained  an  editorial,  under  the 
caption  “Credits  and  Currency,”  the  first  sentence  of 
which,  referring  to  the  monetary  situation,  as  it  then 
existed,  ran  thus:  “The  West  should  surely  have 
learned  something  this  year.” 

II. 

It  is  ardently  to  be  hoped  that  all  the  sections,  the 
West,  the  South  and  the  East,  bound  together  by  the 
immensity  and  the  uniformity  of  their  losses  and  suffer- 
ings, surely  learned  in  1893  that  they  owe  a common 
duly  to  themselves,  to  God,  and  to  human  nature;  that 
the  power  for  evil  of  the  assassin  New  York  National 
Bank  presidents  shall  be  broken  and  destroyed,  once 
for  all;  that,  to  this  end,  it  is  necessary  that  the  Na- 
tional Banking  act  shall  be  repealed,  and  that  fatal 
union  of  banks  and  State  that  in  1893  was  productive 
of  so  much  social  and  industrial  convulsion  and  suffer- 
ing, shall  be  wholly  severed. 

III. 

Eleven  names  more  or  less  constantly  obtrude  them- 
selves in  the  foregoing  pages,  the  first  half-dozen  on 

58 


THE  BANKERS1  CONSPIRACY 


59 


every  occasion.  They  are  those  of  George  G.  Williams, 
president  of  the  Chemical  National  Bank;  Henry  W. 
Cannon,  president  of  the  Chase  National  Bank;  J. 
Edward  Simmons,  president  of  the  Fourth  National 
Bank;  Brayton  Ives,  president  of  the  Western  National 
Bank;  James  T.  Woodward,  president  of  the  Hanover 
National  Bank;  Edward  H.  Perkins,  Jr.,  president  of 
the  Importers’  and  Traders’  National  Bank;  Ebenezer 
K.  Wright,  president  of  the  Park  National  Bank ; George 
F.  Baker,  president  of  the  First  National  Bank;  W. 
W.  Sherman,  president  of  the  National  Bank  of  Com- 
merce; George  S.  Coe,  president  of  the  American  Ex- 
change National  Bank,  and  Frederick  D.  Tappen, 
president  of  the  Gallatin  National  Bank.  These  men 
in  1898  moved  the  whole  National  Banks,  from  Maine 
to  California,  as  if  they  were  but  one  institution,  to  the 
most  infamous  of  purposes,  and  there  was  not  a Na- 
tional Bank  president  or  cashier  anywhere, in  any  State, 
who  was  not  as  absolutely  subject  to  the  discipline  of 
this  New  York  National  Bankarchy  as  if  he  were  an 
enlisted  soldier,  with  no  volition  but  to  obey.  Like  a 
huge  devil-fish,  its  brutal,  frightful,  infamous  head  in 
New  York  City  and  its  tentacles  everywhere,  this  asso- 
ciation of  National  Bank  presidents  crushed  and  de- 
stroyed its  victims,  without  pity  and  without  remorse, 
from  one  end  of  the  land  to  the  other. 

IV. 

The  most  astounding  spectacle  in  American  civil  his- 
tory is  that  of  ten  or  twelve  politically  irresponsible 


60 


THE  BANKERS’  CONSPIRACY 


New  York  National  Bank  presidents,  or  some  of  their 
number — in  confederacy  with  other  New  York  bank 
officers  and  bankers — holding  daily  secret  sessions  in  a 
federal  building,  in  conjunction  with  a federal  officer 
of  high  rank,  and  in  confidential  communication  with 
the  federal  executive,  and  with  a view  to  coerce  Con- 
gress and  the  country  to  a particular  line  of  policy 
wholly  in  their  own  interest  and  to  increase  their  own 
power,  planning  to  assail,  and  then  afterward  actually 
assailing,  the  public  prosperity,  by  banking  operations, 
whereby  the  credits,  the  industry,  the  agriculture,  the 
commerce  and  the  property  of  the  country,  were  design- 
edly injured  to  an  enormous  extent,  the  public  peace  en- 
dangered, the  public  revenues  greatly  diminished,  and 
immense  losses  and  sufferings  inflicted  upon  millions 
of  helpless  and  unoffending  citizens. 

V. 

It  was  by  means  of  this  criminal  attack  by  the  New 
York  National  Bank  presidents  upon  the  public  pros- 
perity that  the  representatives  of  the  people  in  the 
federal  Congress  were  controlled  and  coerced  into  a 
course  of  action,  which,  otherwise,  the  Congress  would 
not  have  consented  to  follow. 

VI. 

Are  these  National  Bank  conspirators  and  their  con- 
federates, who  in  1898  caused  such  enormous  suffering 
and  loss;  who  forced  the  federal  legislature;  who,  with 
an  equal  malignity,  assailed  all  ranks  and  all  classes, 


THE  BANKERS’  CONSPIRACY 


61 


all  conditions  and  all  ages,  rich  and  poor,  men  and 
women,  old  and  young,  the  weak,  the  sick,  the  help- 
less and  the  indigent — who,  in  their  brutality,  spared 
none;  who  carried  want  and  misery  into  a million  of 
humble  homes; who  impaired  or  destroyed  the  fortunes 
of  thousands  even  of  the  rich;  who  enormously  dimin- 
ished the  National  wealth;  who,  in  fifteen  months, 
decreased  the  active  business  of  the  country,  when  com- 
pared with  an  equal  immediately  preceding  period,  by 
more  than  ten  thousand  millions  of  dollars — figures 
four-tenths  greater  than  the  whole  cost  of  the  civil  war; 
the  sum  of  whose  evil  no  man  can  measure,  the  end  of 
whose  evil  no  man  can  foresee — are  the  conspirators  who 
have  done  all  this  to  escape  the  penalty  of  their  crime? 

VII. 

If  ever  there  was  an  instance  in  our  history  when 
iron-handed  punishment  should  be  dealt  relentlessly 
upon  criminal  men,  it  is  in  this  instance. 

VIII. 

u Justice  to  One  and  All”  is  the  heading  of  an  editor- 
ial article  in  the  New  York  Tribune  of  July  21,  1894, 
which  demands  the  punishment  of  the  leaders  in  the 
Pullman  strike.  But  the  conspiring  New  York  Na- 
tional Bank  presidents  and  their  confederates  are  di- 
rectly responsible  for  that  strike.  I call  George  M. 
Pullman  as  my  witness.  “A  little  more  than  a year 
ago,”  said  Pullman  in  his  statement  to  the  public, 
printed  in  the  New  York  Tribune  of  July  14,  1893, 


62 


THE  BANKERS*  CONSPIRACY 


“the  car  shops  at  Pullman  were  in  a most  prosperous 
condition;  work  was  plenty,  wages  were  high,  and  the 
condition  of  the  employes  is  indicated  by  the  fact  that 
the  local  savings  bank  had  of  savings  deposits  nearly 
$700,000 — of  which  nearly  all  was  the  property  of  the 
employes.  Our  pay  rolls  for  that  year  show  an  aver- 
age earning  of  over  $600  per  annum  for  every  person — 
man,  woman,  or  youth — on  the  roll.  Then  came  the 
great  panic  and  depression  of  last  summer.  Many 
customers  stopped  negotiations  and  canceled  orders, 
and  our  working  force  had  to  be  reduced  from  nearly 
6,000  to  about  2,000  in  November.  The  business  de- 
pression existing  throughout  the  country  had  naturally 
resulted  in  a wage  depression,  and  the  only  hope  of 
getting  orders  was  by  bidding  for  work  at  prices  as  low 
as,  or  lower  than,  could  be  made  by  other  shops,  and 
this,  of  course,  necessitated  a reduction  in  the  wages 
of  the  employes  at  Pullman.” 

IX. 

“Justice  to  One  and  All”  is  the  demand  of  the  Trib- 
une and  “Offenders  Who  Must  Not  Escape”  is  the 
caption  of  an  editorial  article  in  the  New  York  Even- 
ing Post  of  July  20,  1894,  which  demands  the  punish- 
ment of  the  Pullman  strike  leaders,  and  even  of  men 
who  justify  in  writing  or  by  speech  the  lawfulness  of 
strikes  and  boycotts.  “Justice  to  One  and  All”- is  the 
demand  of  every  right-minded  citizen,  and  among  the 
“Offenders  Who  Must  Not  Escape”  are  the  conspiring 
New  York  National  Bank  presidents  and  their  confed- 


THE  BANKERS’  CONSPIRACY 


68 


erates  of  every  degree  and  station.  “This  is  obviously 
no  time,”  said  the  Tribune  in  its  article  of  July  21, 
“to  advise  a relaxation  of  the  rigors  of  the  law.”  Un- 
doubtedly the  law  must  be  rigidly  administered,  but 
what  have  the  Tribune  and  the  Evening  Post  to  say 
about  the  conspiring  New  York  National  Bank  pres- 
idents? Will  they  help  me  in  my  effort  to  bring  them 
to  justice? 


THE  MOTIVE  OF  THE  CONSPIRACY. 

The  National  Bank  presidents  were  playing  for  enor- 
mous stakes.  What  those  stakes  were  is  developed  in 
the  so-called  “Baltimore  Plan  of  Currency  Reform” — 
which  was  invented  in  New  York,  but  was  put  forward 
by  Baltimore  confederates  to  avoid  the  stench  of 
Wall  Street. 

If  this  Baltimore  plan  or  its  equivalent  had  succeeded 
or  does  succeed,  it  would  have  been,  or  will  be,  equiv- 
alent to  a free  gift  by  the  Federal  Government  to  the 
NationalBanks  of  Three  Hundred  and  Fifty  Millions  of 
paper  dollars,  at  the  very  lowest  possible  estimate.  The 
share  of  this  enormous  plunder  going  to  the  New  York 
gang  will  be  not  less  than  Forty  Millions. 

It  was  indispensable  to  the  success  of  this  scheme 
that  the  silver  Jaw  should  be  gotten  out  of  the  way, 
for  so  long  as  that  law  was  on  the  statute-book  this 


64 


THE  BANKERS’  CONSPIRACY 


Wall-Street-Baltimore  plan  was  not  possible;  nor  any 
plan  of  its  kind 

The  silver  law  was  gotten  out  of  the  way  by  the  infa- 
mous means  I have  described.  The  attempt  to  get  rid 
of  it  by  a threatened  use  of  the  federal  patronage  was  a 
contemptible  failure,  but  the  Conspiracy  for  Panic  was 
a stupendous  success,  whether  considered  in  its  relation 
to  the  enormous  total  of  property  destroyed  or  the  im- 
measurable sum  of  mental  and  physical  suffering  in- 
flicted, or  to  its  rapid  subjugation  of  Congress  to  the 
most  important  step  in  the  National  Bankers’  pro- 
gram for  power  and  plunder. 

The  enactment  of  the  “Baltimore  plan,”  or  its  equiv- 
alent, would  be  an  intolerable  outrage.  It  is  the  duty 
of  Congress  not  to  reward  crime,  but  to  punish  it.  The 
Conspiracy  for  Panic  should  be  probed  to  its  bottom, 
to  the  end  that  the  facts  shall  be  made  known,  and  that 
every  man  connected  with  it — from  the  highest  to  the 
lowest — shall  be  as  relentlessly  punished  as  the  bankers 
were  relentless  in  their  assault  upon  the  well-being  of 
the  country. 


ADDENDUM  BY  THE  PUBLISHERS. 


In  directing  the  attention  of  the  American  people  to 
the  startling  narrative  contained  in  the  foregoing  pages, 
the  National  Bimetallic  Union  is  actuated  by  no  feel- 
ing of  hostility  to  banks,  as  such.  They  are  agencies  of 
the  utmost  importance  in  modern  business,  and  are  en- 
titled to  both  encouragement  and  protection  in  every 
proper  way. 

But,  while  properly  conducted  banks  are  most  valua- 
ble aids  to  legitimate  industry,  it  is  not  to  be  fairly 
denied  that  they  can  also  be  converted  into  instruments 
of  the  gravest  injustice  and  wrong. 

Not  long  since  the  Michigan  State  grange  very  naively 
declared  in  one  of  its  resolutions  that  the  troubles  of 
our  financial  situation  are  not  so  much  that  the  govern- 
ment is  in  the  banking  business,  as  that  the  banks  are 
in  the  government  business. 

Those  hard-headed  farmers  may  not  be  very  thor- 
oughly informed  as  to  the  merits  of  Kaffir  stocks  or  the 
course  of  London  exchange,  but  in  that  simple  expres- 
sion they  have  stated  the  relation  of  the  National  Banks 
to  American  politics  about  as  accurately  as  it  can  be 
done. 

But  the  reader  must  not  lose  sight  of  the  fact  that 

there  are  bankers  and — bankers. 

65 


66 


THE  BANKERS’  CONSPIRACY 


There  are  “big  bankers”  and  there  are  “little 
bankers.” 

There  are  bankers  in  New  York,  and  there  are  bankers 
elsewhere.  There  are  bankers  in  our  Eastern  cities  who 
are  so  closely  connected  with  London  finances,  that  they 
are  English  rather  than  American  in  their  sentiments, 
and  the  opinions  of  a few  London  financiers  count  for 
more  with  them  than  the  combined  judgment  of  seventy 
millions  of  American  people. 

The  lack  of  patriotism  among  those  engaged  in  fi- 
nancial transactions  abroad  has  been  frequently  re- 
marked. It  was  observed  in  1776  and  again  in  1812. 
It  received  fresh  emphasis  when  President  Cleveland’s 
Venezuelan  message  sent  the  fires  of  American  patriot- 
ism flashing  from  ocean  to  ocean  and  from  Lake  Supe- 
rior to  the  Mexican  Gulf.  Almost  the  only  note  of  dis- 
cord came  from  Mr.  Cleveland’s  friends  in  Wall  Street, 
and  strange  to  say,  prominent  among  the  objectors  are 
found  George  G.  Williams  and  J.  Edward  Simmons, 
two  of  the  most  active  of  the  National  Bank  presidents 
named  by  Mr.  Scliuckers. 

Such  men  would  swallow  the  American  Eagle  plum- 
age and  all,  rather  than  cross  the  pathway  of  English 
ambition. 

The  “almighty dollar, ’’especially if  it  be  a gold  one, 
has  a wonderful  effect  upon  the  opinions  of  some  men. 

But  this  is  a digression.  There  are  bankers  who  are 
heavily  interested  in  the  loaning  of  English  capital  in 
America,  and  they  are  generally  located  in  Wall  Street. 


ADDENDUM  BY  THE  PUBLISHERS 

There  are  those  on  both  continents  who  have  attained 
such  a position  that  they  can  select  and  practically 
monopolize  the  most  valuable  securities  in  the  world, 
as  for  example,  the  bonded  indebtedness  of  powerful 
and  solvent  nations,  such  as  the  United  States,  Great 
Britain,  France  and  Germany.  No  matter  what  the 
general  condition  of  business,  or  how  much  poverty  and 
suffering  may  exist  among  the  masses  of  the  people, 
there  is  practically  no  danger  of  these  securities  de- 
preciating below  the  point  of  safety.  On  the  contrary, 
they  are  more  likely  to  appreciate,  because  as  business 
becomes  depressed  and  unprofitable,  gilt-edged  securi- 
ties come  into  greater  demand  as  investments. 

This  is  shown  by  the  circumstance  that  a United 
States  bond  bearing  but  4 per  cent  interest  stands  away 
above  par  at  times  when  the  manufacturer,  the  mer- 
chant and  the  farmer  find  it  almost  impossible  to  bor- 
row money  upon  any  terms. 

To  the  classes  of  securities  mentioned  above,  may  be 
added  those  of  rich  States  and  municipalities.  Those 
of  strong  and  advantageously  situated  corporations 
might  also  be  included,  and  possibly  some  others  will 
suggest  themselves  to  the  mind  of  the  reader. 

It  should  be  perfectly  manifest  that  bankers  who 
are  engaged  in  no  productive  enterprises,  and  whose 
business  consists  exclusively  of  loaning  money  on  the 
basis  of  securities  the  failure  of  which  is  almost  im- 
possible, are  directly  benefited  by  an  appreciation  of 
money;  that  is,  an  increase  of  its  purchasing  power, 


68  the  bankers’  conspiracy 

which  simply  means  a cheapening  of  those  things  which 
are  bought  and  sold. 

As  Bertram  Currie,  one  of  the  English  delegates  to 
the  Brussels  Conference,  has  remarked:  “Low  prices 
benefit  me,”  Certainly  they  do.  And  they  benefit  all 
others  w7ho  are  similarly  situated 

If  a man’s  wealth  is  all  in  money , and  prices  fall  one- 
half,  it  makes  him  just  twice  as  rich  as  he  was  before. 

But  there  are  bankers  not  so  favorably  situated  as  the 
Rothschilds  and  the  Curries  in  England,  and  the  great 
National  Bankers  named  by  Mr.  Schuckers  in  his  book. 
They  are  scattered  all  over  the  country.  They  are  en- 
gaged in  the  business  of  money  lending,  it  is  true,  but 
they  have  to  take  such  securities  as  they  can  get.  They 
are  largely  dependent  for  success  upon  the  prosperity 
of  the  communities  in  which  they  are  respectively  lo- 
cated. In  many  cases  their  banking  is  merely  auxiliary 
to  other  business,  and  while  up  to  a certain  point  they 
are  benefited  by  a rise  in  the  purchasing  power  of  the 
money  which  they  collect  on  loans,  they  are  injured  to 
a much  greater  extent  by  the  shrinkage  of  other  values. 
In  short,  when  their  business  is  considered  in  its  en- 
tirety, their  interests  will  be  found,  not  on  the  side  of 
the  great  banking  houses  of  Europe  and  America,  but 
upon  the  side  of  the  people  as  a body. 

It  is  vrell  for  the  reader  to  keep  this  distinction  con- 
stantly in  mind  when  dealing  wTith  the  facts  and  con- 
clusions set  forth  by  Mr.  Schuckers. 

Nevertheless, it  cannot  be  truthfully  denied  that  with 


ADDENDUM  BY  THE  PUBLISHERS 


69 


only  rare  exceptions  the  National  Bankers  are  in  perfect 
harmony  on  the  money  question, 

A few  great  bankers  have  undertaken  to  dictate  the 
finances  of  the  world  for  their  own  advantage,  and  the 
most  of  the  small  bankers  have  followed  the  lead  of  the 
great  ones  as  a band  of  sheep  follow  the  bell  wether. 
This  is  partly  owing  to  the  propensity  of  men  engaged 
in  the  same  business  to  follow  the  same  lines  of  thought, 
partly  to  the  ambition  of  small  bankers  to  be  placed  in 
the  same  category  with  the  world’s  great  financiers, 
and  partly  owing  to  the  still  more  persuasive  fact  that 
in  a vast  number  of  cases  the  smaller  banks  are  com- 
pletely in  the  power  of  the  great  ones. 

Without  bestowing  much  thought  upon  the  subject 
themselves,  a large  proportion  of  the  manufacturers 
and  merchants  take  their  cue  from  the  bankers,  so  that 
the  bulk  of  the  capital  is  solidly  massed  together,  on 
purely  monetary  questions.  And  yet  the  interests  of 
these  different  classes  are  by  no  means  identical.  On 
thecontrary,thereareall  sorts  of  differences  and  antag- 
onisms. Every  man,  every  firm,  every  corporation  en- 
gaged in  production  is  benefited  by  rising  prices,  rather 
than  falling. 

The  same  is  true  of  the  merchant,  for  business,  as  a 
rule,  is  always  more  profitable  on  a rising  than  on 
a falling  market.  Of  course  there  are  exceptions. 

If  a large  number  of  small  tradesmen  can  be  crowded 
out,  and  the  business  concentrated  into  a few  gigantic 
concerns,  those  concerns  will  prosper. 


70 


THE  BANKERS7  CONSPIRACY 


Speaking  generally,  rising  prices  are  good  for  those 
engaged  in  production  and  trade,  falling  prices  are  good 
for  those  whose  business  is  exclusively, or  chiefly, money 
lending,  and  who  are  so  situated  that  they  can  control 
the  securities  in  which  they  deal. 

Taking  these  facts  as  a starting  point,  it  is  easy  to 
see  why  the  tremendous  power  of  the  great  banks  is 
being  constantly  exerted  to  bring  about  an  appreciation 
of  money. 

When  we  consider  that  money  can  only  be  appre- 
ciated—that  is,  made  dearer— by  reducing  or  limiting 
its  quantity,  the  reason  for  their  unyielding  hostility  to 
silver  becomes  as  plain  as  day. 

The  fact  that  Alfred  de  Rothschild  made  a proposi- 
tion in  the  Brussels  Conference,  for  the  utilization  of 
silver  to  a limited  extent,  does  not  in  the  slightest  mili- 
tate against  this  view.  His  action  was  a simple  recog- 
nition of  the  fact  that  it  was  not  safe  to  carry  the 
onslaught  upon  silver  too  far,  because  it  might  lead  to 
so  fearful  a destruction  of  property  values,  and  so  much 
suffering  among  the  people,  as  to  light  the  fires  of  a 
revolution  that  would  destroy  even  the  “money  kings” 
themselves. 

Mr.  Schuckers  presents  an  array  of  facts  and  coinci- 
dences which  makes  it  impossible  to  resist  the  conclu- 
sion, that  the  National  Bank  presidents  whom  he 
names,  in  conjunction  with  the  President  of  the  United 
States,  Secretary  Carlisle,  and  Assistant  Treasurer  Jor- 
dan, deliberately  entered  into  a conspiracy  to  precipi- 


ADDENDUM  BY  THE  PUBLISHERS 


71 


tate  a panic  upon  the  country,  in  order  to  force  the 
repeal  of  the  “Sherman  Law.” 

The  motive  for  this  conspiracy,  if  there  was  one,  was 
plain.  Without  a single  exception  these  men  were  in 
favor  of  what  they  call  “sound  money;”  that  is,  dear 
money — money  a dollar  of  which  will  buy  a large 
amount  of  other  people’s  property,  and  which  is  all  the 
time  increasing  in  its  purchasing  power.  They  were  op- 
posed to  the  “Sherman  Law”  because  it  was  adding 
about  $4,000,000  to  the  currency  each  month,  thus  in  a 
measure,  at  least,  preventing  the  operation  of  their 
favorite  policy  of  constantly  appreciating  the  standard 
by  which  property  in  general  is  valued. 

The  opportunity  was  propitious.  A constant  fall  of 
prices  ha$  been  going  on  for  about  twenty  years,  and 
the  paying  power  of  debtors  had  been  tremendously 
weakened.  When  prices  are  down  to  the  lowest  living 
point,  it  is  a very  easy  matter  for  the  creditor  to  force 
the  debtor  to  the  walk  By  withholding  credit  from 
their  subordinate  banks  the  latter  were  driven  to  the 
necessity  of  doing  the  same  with  their  patrons,  and  thus 
a pressure  begun  in  New  York  would  extend  over  the 
entire  country,  but  more  especially  into  the  South  and 
West,  the  sections  which  needed  coercing, 

A combination  between  the  banks  and  the  President 
was  almost  certain  to  be  successful.  The  “Sherman 
Law”  once  repealed,  the  silver  men  could  not  take  an- 
other step  for  the  restoration  of  the  bimetallic  system 
in  the  United  States,  without  a complete  political  rev- 


72 


THE  BANKERS5  CONSPIRACY 


olution  which  would  give  them  both  houses  of  Con- 
gress and  the  executive  as  well. 

Mr.  Schuckers  has  pointed  out  graphically  and  power- 
fully the  steps  by  which  this  conspiracy  Anally  suc- 
ceeded 

If  we  had  the  minute  information  necessary  to  enable 
us  to  do  so,  we  could  add  nothing  to  the  force  of  his 
statement. 

It  ought,  though,  to  be  impressed  indelibly  upon  the 
minds  of  all  classes  of  readers  that  in  the  consumma- 
tion of  this  scheme,  something  like  600  banks  and 
thousands  of  business  men  were  ruined.  Thousands  of 
factories  were  closed.  Millions  of  people  were  thrown 
out  of  employment,  and  suffering  stalked  broadcast 
through  the  land. 

And  while  this  was  going  on  the  great  banks  speciAed 
by  Mr.  Schuckers  stood  securely  behind  their  impregna- 
ble fortiAcations,  unshaken  by  the  storm. 

Of  course  those  who  were  engaged  in  the  work  of 
forcing  the  repeal  of  the  silver  purchase  law,  ascribed 
the  panic  to  the  law  itself.  This,  however,  will  not 
bear  analysis. 

It  was  claimed  that  the  addition  of  so  much  silver  to 
the  currency  had  created  a want  of  conAdence  which 
led  to  the  panic. 

Had  this  been  true,  the  “want  of  conAdence”  would 
have  shown  itself  with  reference  to  this  particular  kind 
of  money,  and  it  so  happens  that  the  “Sherman  notes,” 
and  the  silver  dollars  at  times  during  that  panic,  actu- 
ally commanded  a premium. 


ADDENDUM  BY  THE  PUBLISHERS 


78 


The  idea  of  people  having  no  confidence  in  money 
and  at  the  same  time  paying  a premium  for  it,  is  one 
that  will  not  address  itself  very  forcibly  to  the  average 
mind. 

The  manifestations  of  the  panic  were  altogether  at 
variance  with  the  alleged  cause. 

It  was  essentially  a money  panic.  All  kinds  of  money 
were  locked  up  and  withdrawn  from  circulation,  mak- 
ing it  impossible  for  business  men  to  pay  their  debts, 
with  the  calamitous  results  so  vividly  portrayed  by  Mr. 
Sch  uckers. 

But  whatever  may  be  thought  as  to  the  fact  of  the 
alleged  conspiracy,  it  should  be  obvious  to  every  intel- 
ligent and  thoughtful  person  that  there  is  no  com- 
munity of  interest  whatever  between  the  great  banks  of 
New  York,  with  their  European  connections,  and  the 
smaller  banks  that  are  scattered  far  and  wide  over  the 
country. 

As  before  suggested,  the  great  banks  are  directly  in- 
terested in  appreciating  money,  which  makes  it  harder 
for  the  debtor  to  meet  his  obligations.  Unless  it  be 
carried  to  the  length  of  forcing  the  country  into  a rev- 
olution, they  can  always  protect  themselves.  They  do 
this,  however,  at  the  expense  of  others,  and  not,  unfre- 
quently  they  emerge  from  a great  financial  storm  richer 
than  ever  before. 

The  extraordinary  percentage  of  failures  among  the 
Western  and  Southern  banks  should  be  proof  to  the 
most  skeptical  that  their  interests  are  with  the  pro- 
ducers, and  not  with  the  great  Eastern  banks. 


74 


THE  BANKERS’  CONSPIRACY 


If  the  people  of  those  sections  could  have  turned 
their  property,  either  real  or  personal,  into  money  at 
fair  prices,  they  could  have  met  their  obligations  at 
their  local  banks. ' Then  the  latter  would  have  had  no 
difficulty  in  responding  to  every  demand  upon  them 
from  whatever  quarter. 

Is  it  not  about  time  for  the  thousands  of  small 
bankers  and  the  hundreds  of  thousands  of  business  men 
in  the  United  States  to  break  the  thralldom  that  binds 
them  to  the  golden  chariot  of  a few  gigantic  banking 
houses  in  New  York  and  London? 

A little  reflection  should  convince  them  that  this 
gorgeous  chariot  is,  after  all,  in  but  too  many  cases  a 
veritable  juggernaut  for  them.  Whenever  their  inter- 
ests require  it,  the  so-called  “money  kings”  will  crush 
the  smaller  banker,  the  manufacturer  and  the  merchant 
as  unpityingly  as  the  Carthagenian  “Moloch”  ever 
rolled  a babe  into  the  flames. 

If  these  classes  will  calmly,  intelligently  and  impar- 
tially study  the  questions  involved  in  the  great  “battle 
of  the  standards,  ” they  will  no  longer  blindly  follow 
the  lead  of  a few  men  whose  interests  are  wholly  at 
variance  with  those  of  productive  industry. 

Let  them  ignore,  if  they  will,  the  crude  arguments  of 
a host  of  ill-informed  writers  on  both  sides,  and  go 
direct  to  the  best  and  highest  sources  of  information. 

Let  them  read  and  ponder  well  the  proceedings  of 
the  Paris  international  monetary  conference  of  1878. 
Let  them  note  the  significant  words  of  the  learned  Dr. 


ADDENDUM  BY  THE  PUBLISHERS 


75 


Bruch,  a Swedish  delegate  to  that  conference,  referring 
to  the  interests  of  the  United  States: 

“Mr.  Broch  recognized  that  the  United  States  had  a 
great  interest  in  having  other  countries  make  equal  use 
of  the  two  metals  for  their  monetary  circulation  and 
give  equally  to  both  the  legal-tender  character.  The 
United  States  fear  that  if  the  States  still  subjected  to 
the  regime  of  paper  money  resume  specie  payments 
with  the  single  gold  standard  this  will  immediately  pro- 
duce the  double  consequence  of  augmenting  in  a high 
degree  the  value  of  gold  and  of  depreciating  that  of  pro- 
ducts of  every  kind;  a result  which,  from  their  point 
of  view,  as  a great  producing  country  and  as  a great 
debtor  state,  would,  in  fact,  present  disadvantages.  The 
United  States  have  a heavy  debt,  and  it  must  be  ad- 
mitted that  a rise  of  gold  would,  with  one  blow,  aggra- 
vate the  weight  of  the  debt.” 

The  appreciation  of  gold  depreciates  the  value  of  our 
products,  and  aggravates  the  weight  of  our  debt,  says 
this  gentleman,  who  was  himself  a pronounced  advo- 
cate of  the  gold  standard. 

Let  them  read  the  report  of  the  Royal  Commission  of 
England  upon  the  gold  and  silver  question, — a com- 
mission consisting  of  six  gold  monometallists  and  six 
bimetallists. 

Let  them  read  the  testimony,  embodying  the  best 
thought  on  both  sides  of  the  question,  that  was  laid  be 
fore  that  commission. 

Let  them  then  take  up  the  proceedings  of  the  Brus- 


76 


THE  BANKERS5  CONSPIRACY 


sels  conference,  and  compare  the  arguments  of  Mr.  de 
Rothschild,  Sir  Charles  Fremantle,  Bertram  Currie  and 
Sir  Rivers  Wilson  on  the  gold  side,  with  those  of  Sir 
William  Houldsworth,  Sir  Guilford  Molesworth,  Mr. 
Allard,  Dr.  Andrews  and  John  P.  Jones  on  the  side  of 
bimetallism, — let  them  do  these  things  and  there  can 
be  no  doubt  as  to  their  conclusion. 

They  will  find  that  the  leading  advocates  of  the  gold 
standard  take  a position  that  is  merely  one  of  negation. 
In  many  cases  they  concede  that  industrial  conditions 
are  unnatural  and  unsatisfactory,  but  they  offer  no 
scheme  of  relief  which  presents  even  a glimmer  of  hope. 
As  their  arguments  are  purely  negative,  so  their  pro- 
posed course  is  one  of  inaction.  Their  principal  argu- 
ment, that  the  great  fall  in  prices  and  consequent  busi- 
ness depression  is  the  result  of  overproduction,  is  one 
that  casts  a shadow  over  the  entire  human  family.  If 
overproduction  is  the  cause  of  the  trouble,  reduced  pro- 
dution  must  be  the  remedy.  What  does  such  a remedy 
mean  to  more  than  a thousand  millions  of  men  and 
women  whose  daily  bread  depends  upon  their  daily  toil? 

On  the  other  hand,  the  bimetallist  not  only  denies 
the  alleged  overproduction,  but  he  effectually  disproves 
it.  He  conclusively  demonstrates  that  the  material 
conditions  which  beset  us,  date  from  the  demonetiza- 
tion of  silver  in  1873,  and  with  inexorable  logic  he 
shows  that  they  are  the  natural  result  of  the  apprecia- 
tion of  gold. 

The  works  referred  to  above  are  easily  within  reach 
of  every  banker  and  business  man  in  America. 


ADDENDUM  BY  THE  PUBLISHERS 


77 


If  these  men  will  but  follow  the  course  here  suggested, 
the  senseless  catch  phrases  so  familiar  to  us  all,  such  as 
“sound  money,”  “honest  money, ” “50-cent  dollars,” 
and  the  like,  will  cease  to  warp  the  judgments  of  men, 
and  the  strange  spectacle  will  no  longer  be  presented  of 
bankers,  manufaturers  and  merchants  marching  in 
almost  solid  phalanx  to  the  support  of  a policy  diamet- 
rically opposed  to  the  interests  of  the  most  of  them, 
and  subversive  of  true  prosperity  in  the  United  States. 


THE  END. 


These 

Hard  Times . . . 
hereiore  and  how  Long? 

A KEY  TO  THE  FINANCIAL  SITUATION. 

By  REV.  J.  C.  ELLIOT. 

This  book  discusses,  in  a scholarly  manner,  the  uses 
of  money,  change  of  unit,  effect  on  property,  rise  of 
gold,  stability  of  silver,  growth  of  wealth,  supply  of 
gold  and  silver,  mines  and  prosperity,  profits  of  mining, 
effect  on  character  and  nation,  international  agree- 
ment, greater  security,  National  Banks,  and  arguments 
for  a gold  basis. 

The  demand  exhausted  the  first  edition;  since  when, 
the  author  has  revised  and  strengthened  this  book,  and 
it  is  to-day  the  most  interesting  and  instructive  book 
on  the  monetary  question,  for  its  price. 

In  the  preface,  the  author  says:  “This  book  is  the 
result  of  studies  undertaken  solely  for  the  purpose  of 
discovering,  if  possible,  the  mysterious  cause  of  the  de- 
pressed times.  I have  no  personal  interest  in  the 
question,  and  so  far  as  I know,  I am  free  from  party 
bias  of  any  kind.  If  the  reader  has  a logical  mind,  and 
will  read  this  book  through,  he  will  be  led  irresistibly, 
as  I have  been,  to  the  belief  that  our  trouble  is  mone- 
tary, and  that  there  should  be  a change  in  our  financial 
policy.” 

Price  25  cents. 

With  the  NATIONAL  BIMETALLIST,  $1.15. 
Published  and  for  sale  by  the 

AMERICAN  BIMETALLIC  UNION, 

134  Monroe  Street,  Chicago,  Illinois. 

78 


THE  BANKER’S  DREAM. 

BY 

THOMAS.  H.  PROCTOR. 

Part  I.  of  this  book  is  fiction  based  on  fact. 

Part  II.  is  a dream  written  two  years  ago.  This  dream 
or  vision  gives  a detailed  description  of  the  develop- 
ment, unfolding  and  realization  of  the  coming  struggle 
of  this  nation.  It  is  so  prophetic  of  what  has  and  is 
daily  occurring,  that  it  must  interest  and  start  a new 
train  of  thought  in  the  mind  of  the  reader,  be  he  ever 
so  skeptical,  rich  or  poor. 

The  Financial  Review  of  Chicago  reviews  this  book  in 
a five  column  article  by  John  M.  Batchelor,  and  says 
every  American  should  read  it. 

The  Medical  World  says  the  book  is  written  by  a high 
minded  and  earnest  lover  of  humanity,  and  is  a serious 
warning  against  the  calamities  that  will  soon  overtake 
us  if  we  continue  in  our  present  financial  and  govern- 
mental course. 

The  Philadelphia  Item  says  it  is  the  book  of  the  cen- 
tury. 

The  Bayonne  Budget  says  it  is  the  most  interesting  of 
all  books  that  have  been  published  on  the  monetary 
question.  Get  the  book  and  read  it. 

Living  Issues  says  every  friend  of  honest  money  should 
read  this  book. 

The  Cotton  Plant  says:  It  is  readable  and  instruct- 
ive. 

The  Vineland  Independent  says:  The  rich  men  should 
read  this  book  before  it  is  too  late  to  apply  the  needed 
legislation. 

The  Shoe  and  Leather  Facts  says:  The  work  is  likely 
to  be  widely  read  by  persons  of  every  political  school 
of  thought. 

Price  25  cents,  or  with  the  NATIONAL  BIMET- 
ALLIST for  one  year,  $1.15.  Address  all  orders  to 
THE  AMERICAN  BIMETALLIC  UNION, 

134  Monroe  Street,  Chicago,  111. 

79 


